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INTRODUCTION 
That the conduct of human affairs does not always conform to the 
requirements of the law is a surprise to no one. But in few areas of 
critical life and death decisions is there such a disparity between com-
monly recognized principles of law and developing medical practice as 
exists in the area of withholding lifesaving medical care from infants, 
notably defective infants. The law is said to restrict physicians and 
parents from withholding lifesaving treatment from infants for the 
*Professor of Law, University of Louisville; B.A. 1968, Buena Vista College; M.A. 1971, 
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purpose of causing their deaths.1 Yet it is reported that it is not un-
common for lifesaving treatment to be denied severely defective in-
fants, and that thousands of infant deaths result each year from this 
lack of treatment. 2 
1. The legal principles and existing laws regarding withholding medical care from in-
fants are carefully reviewed and analyzed in Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who 
Decides? 7 AM. J. LIT. MED. 393, 402-13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ellis]; Horan, Eutha· 
nasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child: Death as a Treatment of Choice?, 
27 BAYLOR L. REV. 76, 78-85 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Horan]; Mueller & Phoenix, A 
Dilemma for the Legal and Medical Professions-Euthanasia and the Defective New· 
born, 22 ST. Loms U. L. REV. 501, 504-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mueller & Phoe-
nix]; Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 213, 217-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]; Robertson, Legal As· 
pects of Withholding Medical Treatment from Handicapped Children, in LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 213, 214-22 
(A.E. Doudera & J.D. Peters eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, Legal Aspects]; 
Sharp & Crofts, Death with Dignity, the Physician's Civil Liability, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 
86 (1975); Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Consider· 
ations, 48 NOTRE DAME L.J. 1202, 1203-27 (1973); Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Stan· 
dard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599, 613-19 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as A Standard for Nontreatment]. See also Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liabil-
ity for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Foreman]; Levin & Levin, DNR: An Objectionable Form of Euthanasia, 49 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 567 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Levin & Levin]. According to these commentators, 
those who withhold lifesaving treatment from infants might be guilty of murder, involun-
tary manslaughter, conspiracy, child abuse and neglect, and violating the child abuse 
reporting laws. See, e.g., Foreman, supra. It is also suggested that civil liability might be 
imposed for wrongful death, negligence, abandonment, and violations of federal civil 
rights. See generally Mueller & Phoenix, supra. The Department of Health and Human 
Services has suggested that hospitals receiving federal financial assistance violate federal 
law if they withhold treatment, or permit treatment to be withheld because an infant is 
handicapped. See notes 222-36 and accompanying text infra. 
The consensus of the commentators is that withholding lifesaving treatment from 
infants violates current legal standards. At least one commentator believes that an alter-
native "medical-feasibility standard" is permitted under current laws. See A Standard 
for Nontreatment, supra, at 623-32. This, however, is only a slight variation in the inter-
pretation of current legal standards. 
Under certain conditions, parents have been found guilty of homicide for failing to 
provide adequate medical care for their children. See, e.g., Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 
139 N.W. 676, aff'd on reh'g, 94 Neb. 151, 142 N.W. 676 (1913); State v. House, 260 Or. 
138, 489 P.2d 381 (1971); State v. Williains, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971). The 
history of parental obligation to provide medical care is reviewed in State v. Clark, 5 
Conn. Cir. Ct. 699, 261 A.2d 294 (1969). See generally Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child 
Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975). 
2. Estimates given before a congressional subcommittee of the number of infant 
deaths resulting from the withdrawal of lifesaving treatment ranged from a few thousand 
to several thousand each year. Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival, 1974: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. [14, 26 (1974) (testimony of Dr. Robert E. Cooke and Dr. 
Raymond S. Duft) [hereinafter cited as Medical Ethics Hearings]. See also Duff & 
Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in a Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. 
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This disparity between the law and practice may result from con-
fusion in the medical community about the legal standards for non-
treatment decisions,3 or from the absence of any effective mechanism 
to enforce the law." The purpose of this article is to clarify important 
issues regarding the legal standards which should be used in making 
treatment decisions, and to suggest ways that such legal standards 
might be enforced. 
Much of the discussion of withholding lifesaving treatment has 
been of an unusually high quality.11 There remains some confusion, 
MED. 890 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Duff & Campbell]. In this article the authors esti-
mated that 14% of all infant deaths which occurred in the hospital were a result of 
withdrawing or withholding medical treatment. Id. 
3. Both those physicians who specialize in the treatment of neonates and those who 
do not, have indicated to the author uncertainty about their legal position in withholding 
treatment from infants. Some expressed doubts that their own conduct conformed to the 
requirements of the law. These physicians uniformly appeared deeply concerned about 
the effects of these decisions upon the infants and their families, and most expressed a 
desire to have a clear understanding of their legal responsibilities. 
Any legal standards which are applied must be clear so as to avoid continuing the 
confusion in the medical community on this issue. In their effort to eliminate the confu-
sion regarding the withholding of treatment through the discontinuance of life-support 
systems, the Los Angeles bar and medical associations agreed upon certain guidelines. 
According to these standards, treatment may be withheld if brain death criteria are met 
(see note 15 infra), if the provisions of the Natural Death Act are met (see note 36 
infra), or if the patient is in an irreversible coma and had not expr\'lssed a desire to have 
life-support systems in such circumstances and the family or guardian agrees to the ter-
mination. See Middletown, Bar Joins in Issuing Life-Support Guidelines, 7 BAR LEADER 
27 (July-Aug. 1981). While efforts to clarify the legal obligations of the physicians should 
be made, some doubts must be expressed as to the wisdom, and even the propriety, of 
medical and bar associations determining such standards through joint statements. It 
would seem more appropriate for these groups to submit such proposals to the legisla-
tures or to file amicus briefs for judicial evaluation in pending court actions. 
4. In many instances, the decision to withhold lifesaving medical treatment is not 
authoritatively reviewed by anyone. See notes 209-46 and accompanying text infra. 
5. For a few of the excellent articles and discussions on this subject see P. RAMSEY, 
ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 189-267 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RAMSEY]; WHO SHALL 
LIVE? (K. VAUX ed. 1970); Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making 
Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Bennett]; Coburn, Morality and the Defective Newborn, J. MED. PHILOS. 340 (1980); 
Duff & Campbell, supra note 2; Ellis, supra note 1; Fletcher, Attitudes Toward Defec-
tive Newborns, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher]; Free-
man, Is There a Right to Die-Quickly?, 80 J. PEDIATRICS 904 (1972); Mueller & Phoe-
nix, supra note 1; Robertson, supra note 1; Smith, On Letting Some Babies Die, 2 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37 (1974); Shatten & Chabon, Decision-Making and the Right to 
Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for Defective Newborns, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 59 (1982); 
Trinkaus, Decision Making for Newborns in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING 
CRITICALLY AND TER~UNALLY ILL PATIENTS (A. Douders & J. Peters eds. (1982)); A Stan-
dard for Nontreatment, supra note 1. But see Sherlock, For Everything There is a Sea-
son: The Right to Die in the United States, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 561 (claiming that 
the discussion of euthanasia has been of low quality). 
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however, about several central issues. Areas of confusion which will be 
examined in this article are the autonomy privacy interests of children 
which can be exercised by parents,6 the distinction between "ordinary" 
and "extraordinary treatment,"7 and the proper factors to be consid-
ered in making nontreatment decisions.8 The full complexity, extent, 
and implications of these decisions have not been recognized. The com-
plexity of nontreatment decisions is demonstrated by a Decision Ma-
trix, 9 which also aids in the identification of the factors which may play 
a role in nontreatment decisions. It is postulated that parents cannot 
exercise a child's autonomy rights, that the distinction between ex-
traordinary and ordinary treatment is confusing and dangerous and 
that generally the perceived quality of life of an infant or the effect of 
its life on its family or others are not legally sufficient bases for with-
holding treatment. The circumstances under which parents may prop-
erly be permitted to withhold treatment are identified. 
"Infants," as used in this article, refers to minors not old enough 
or competent to participate in any way in making medical decisions. 
Competent adults, and children with the degree of maturity which per-
mits them to understand and appreciate medical alternatives and con-
sequences,10 and even adults who were once competent, present signifi-
cantly different issues.11 They can participate in a determination of 
6. See notes 49-92 and accompanying text infra. 
7. See notes 117-46 and accompanying text infra. 
8. See notes 147-206 and accompanying text infra. 
9. See notes 96-118 and accompanying text infra. 
10. Competent adults are generally thought to have a right, at least partially based in 
their right to privacy, to refuse medical treatment for themselves even though this re-
fusal might seriously endanger their lives. See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 
F. Supp. 125 (N.D. ID. 1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Suenram v. 
Society of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977). However, in many 
instances the courts have found reasons to compel the treatment. 
Courts commonly identify the protection of the rights of innocent third parties as 
their reason for ordering medical treatment. See, e.g., Application of President and Di-
rectors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Unites States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 
1965); Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
985 (1964). In many of these cases it would appear that the courts' reason for ordering 
treatment is their reluctance to permit even a competent adult to die fpr the lack of 
relatively risk-free treatment when this treatment is refused for what the courts view as 
insignificant reasons. See generally Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the 
Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1975); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline 
Life-Saving Treatment: Bodily Integrity versus The Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 228 (1973); Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose 
Law Should Prevail?, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 1 (1975); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment 
and Constitutional Guarantees: A Conflict?, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 628 (1972). 
11. Adults who were once competent have had an opportunity to participate in treat-
ment decisions before becoming incompetent. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 
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whether or not to undertake treatment and, therefore, exercise their 
rights of privacy directly. Lifesaving treatment is broadly defined as 
medical activity which will have a nontrivial impact on the survival of 
the infant in the foreseeable future; medical treatment which is not 
lifesaving is not considered.12 Although there are circumstances involv-
ing nonlifesaving treatment in which there is an important state inter-
est, the state interest in such situations is less profound, immediate, 
and clear than it is in life and death decisions.13 This article does not 
deal with the distribution of a scarce medical resource as between two 
infants when only one may have it, e.g., two infants need a special neo-
nate incubator and only one is available.14 Nor does it deal directly 
A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (court noted that Karen Ann Quinlan previ-
ously advised parents she would not want to be maintained in a vegetative condition); In 
re Storar (Eichner), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (court per-
mitted discontinuance of patient's respirator after noting that prior to incompetency he 
had consistently requested he not be maintained by artificial means in the event of an 
irreversible coma). 
There are dangers inherent in relying exclusively on statements concerning one's 
wishes for treatment in the event that he should become nonsapient. Such statements 
may not have been carefully considered and may be only the cavalier or heroic comments 
made when not facing life and death decisions. The "living will" or "natural death" legis-
lation is an effort to deal with this issue. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra. 
12. Courts have been reluctant to overturn parental decisions to withhold nonlifesav-
ing treatment from infants even when the treatment has been recommended by medical 
authorities. The courts have ordered such treatment when there is a need, for example, 
to protect third parties from the harm of infectious diseases. These decisions generally 
have upheld legislatively mandated treatment such as compulsory smallpox vaccinations. 
See note 30 infra. Courts have, on rare occasions, ordered nonlifesaving treatment when 
the lack of such treatment would have serious nonfatal effects on the child. See, e.g., 
People v. Labrenz, 411 ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re 
Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 900, 
278 N.E.2d 913, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). 
There are also instances when the parents' decision to consent to treatment has been 
questioned. Parental decisions to have a child sterilized have been scrutinized by the 
courts even though the parental decision is, arguendo, based on the fact that the diffi-
culty in rearing the child will be eased by the treatment when the child's mental condi-
tion makes it impossible for him to understand the consequences of sexuality. For a 
review of the attitude of the courts toward these parental decisions see Bennett, supra 
note 5. 
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (the state has an interest in protecting the 
health of a pregnant woman and may to some extent regulate abortions to protect the 
health of the woman during the first two trimesters of pregnancy). There are limited 
circumstances where the state interest in requiring treatment, which is not clearly life-
saving, may be as strong as the ordinary lifesaving treatment case. Compulsory innocula-
tion against contagious disease or examination for contagious diseases may protect others 
from potentially fatal disease. See, e.g., People v. Strautz, 386 ill. 360, 54 N.E. 360 (1944) 
(state may compel examination for venereal disease of those charged with sex related 
offenses). See also note 12 supra & note 30 infra. 
14. The distribution of scarce lifesaving medical facilities presents special problems 
which are different from the issues presented when the resources are currently available 
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with the definition of infant death.111 We are generally dealing with in-
fants with at least some level of higher brain activity (so that they are 
not dead by any recognized standard)16 although the special problems 
for everyone immediately needing them. Even when scarce medical resources must be 
distributed to only a limited number of those who require them, there is no agreement 
whether, or to the extent to which, the "value" of the lives of those involved should be 
considered in making treatment decisions. See Annas, Allocation of Artificial Hearts in 
the Year 2002: Minerva v. National Health Agency, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 59 (1977); Katz, 
Selection of Hemodialysis and Organ Transplant Recipients, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 373 
(1973); Note, Due Process in the Allocation of Scarce Life Saving Medical Resources, 84 
YALE L.J. 1734 (1975). 
Scarcity of medical resources often results from the allocation of society's total re-
sources. The indirect effects on other patients of treating one patient with scarce medical 
resources are extremely uncertain and impossible to calculate. See generally Kramer, 
Ethical Issues in Neonatal Intensive Care: An Economic Perspective, in ETHICS OF 
NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 75 (1976). 
15. The permanent cessation of all brain activity is now commonly considered to be 
the definition of death. Many states have adopted brain death by statute, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977 & Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. 
CODE art. 43 § 54f (1980 Rep!. Vol.). See BiOrck, When is Death?, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 484; 
Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 
Mo. L. REV. 337, 338-40 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brant]; Capron & Kass, A Statutory 
Definition of Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 
121 U. PA. L. REv. 87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Capron & Kass]; ·Charron, Death: A 
Philosophical Perspective on the Legal Definitions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 979; Compton, 
Telling the Time of Human Death by Statute: An Essential and Progressive Trend, 31 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 521 (1974); Hirsh, Brain Death: Medico-Legal Fact, or Fiction, 3 
N. Kv. L.F. 16 (1975); Price, Defining Death and Dying: A Bibliographic Overview, 71 L. 
Lm. J. 49 (1978); Schneck, Brain Death and Prolonged States of Impaired Responsive-
ness, 58 DEN. L.J. 609 (1981). There are, however, some jurisdictions in which it is not 
clear that brain death has been completely accepted. Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 
Mass. 249, 255, 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978). 
16. It has been suggested that the definition of death should be based on higher brain 
function. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 386, 404-06 (1981); Kluge, The Euthanasia of Radically Defective Neonates: 
Some Statutory Considerations, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 229, 244-54 (1980) [hereinafter cited 
as Kluge]. See R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 68 (1976); 
Capron & Kass, supra note 15; Olinger, Medical Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 22 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Olinger]. Louisiana at least appears to implicitly accept a higher 
brain death standard for infants by prohibiting parents from withholding lifesaving 
treatment from defective infants, but permitting the treatment to be withheld from per-
manently comatose infants. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1983). See In re 
P. V. W., No. 82-CA-2637 (La. Dec. 10, 1982) (available Feb. 20, 1983, on LEXIS, States 
libary). 
Definitions of "human person" have been proposed, although not generally seriously 
considered or approved, which would further narrow the group of beings given the full 
protections of the law. One such suggestion is for a "delayed personhood policy" under 
which the state would delay recognizing the child's personhood until its potential for 
development and growth is established. MARKS & SALKOVITZ, The Defective Newborn: 
An Analytic Framework for a Policy Dialogue in ETHICS OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 
110-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MARKS & SALKOVITZ]. At the other extreme, legisla-
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of the infant with anencephaly17 are noted. We assume that we are 
dealing with postnatal, or at least postviable, infants so that abortion 
issues are not relevant.18 In short, we are dealing with human persons 
to the extent that there is a current common or constitutional under-
standing of that concept.19 
I. LIFESAVING TREATMENT, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY 
A. Parental Authority and Medical Decisions 
Parents generally are empowered to make medical decisions con-
cerning their infant children.20 This authority, as the more general 
tion has been introduced to define human life as beginning at conception. See note 19 
infra. 
17. Complete anencephalics are normally stillborn, although some live for 4 and even 
16 days in extreme cases. J. WARKANY, CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 199 (1971). Of 
greater concern here are partial anencephalics. Such infants have no forebrains and may 
or may not have midbrains. They are limited to primitive functions necessary to life and 
will live, with motor actions comparable to those of a normal human fetus after 3 or 4 
months gestation. Id. 
18. It may be that a state could define human life so as not to include all viable 
fetuses, although its authority to do so is not entirely clear. The Supreme Court has 
suggested (without clearly saying so) that a state could not define a fetus as fully human 
prior to viability. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Special Project, Perspectives on Viability, 1980 Amz. ST. L.J. 128. See generally, 
Note, Artificial Gestation: New Meaning for the Right to Terminate Pregnancy, 21 
ARIZ. L. REV. 755 (1979). The strict limitation on withholding treatment from infants is 
fully consistent with a general right to abortion. By understanding viability as the begin-
ning of human life, for example, one can argue for abortion rights (the destruction of 
something not yet human) and for severe limits on withholding treatment from infants 
(destroying something that is human). 
19. For discussions regarding the definition of human life which would deny "per-
sonhood" status to defective infants see McCormick, To Save or Let Die-The Dilemma 
of Modern Medicine, J. A.M.A. 172 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; Note, 
Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Substituted Judgment, Informed 
Consent, and the Quinlan Decision, 13 GoNz. L. REv. 781, 787-89 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Substituted Judgment]. 
Legislative proposals have been made to define human life as beginning prior to 
viability notwithstanding the decisions of the Supreme Court. S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S11514 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 
127 CoNG. REC. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981); see Hyde, The Human Life Bill: Some 
Issues and Answers, 27 N.Y.L. See. L. REv. 1077 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hyde]. 
20. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), a leading child treatment 
consent case, the court noted that: 
[i]n deference to common experience there is general recognition of the fact that 
many persons by reason of their youth are incapable of intelligent decision. • • • 
Hence, it is not at all surprising that, generally speaking, the rule has been con-
sidered to be that a surgeon has no legal right to operate upon a child without 
the consent of his parents or guardian. 
Id. at 122. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 
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right of parents to make decisions for their children, rests on the right 
of privacy of parents in child rearing21 and on the common law as-
sumption that parents have the greatest possible interest in the physi-
cal and emotional well-being of their children.22 Theoretically this 
strong interest in promoting the best interests of their children will 
lead parents to make careful medical decisions which advance the 
health of the child at the least risk to the child.23 In practice, of course, 
parents' medical decisions may, in some instances, be influenced by 
factors which are not consistent with the best interests of the child. 
The cost of care,24 the effects of the child on the family,211 the fact that 
N.J. Super. 398, 177 A.2d 58 (1962); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 
(1956). See Arleen, Interuention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the 
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975); Bennet, Alloca· 
tion of Child Medical Care Decision-Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 
62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976); Ewald, Medical Decision Making for Children: An Analysis of 
Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 689 (1982); Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed 
Consent" in Children, 289 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 885 (1973); Note, State Intrusion into 
Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974). See also 
note 22 infra. 
21. The interest in family life and the rights of parents to make important decisions 
for their children, based on constitutional privacy, and its antecedent constitutional con-
cepts, have been recognized for some time. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) 
(parents have an interest in knowing about immature minors' decisions even when the 
minors are exercising a constitutionally protected right of privacy, i.e., to obtain an abor-
tion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (legal restrictions on minors which support 
the parental role aid the child's growth into a mature citizen); United States v. Orito, 413 
U.S. 139 (1973) (privacy protects marriage, motherhood, child rearing and education); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy protects procreation decisions and includes 
child rearing); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (American tradition supports the 
parents' primary role in their children's upbringing); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 
(1968) (the constitution supports the parents' claim to control the upbringing of their 
children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents have a constitutional 
right to direct the education of their children). 
22. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1980), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 959 (1980); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); Friedrichsen v. 
Niemotka, 71 N.J. Super. 398, 177 A.2d 58 (1962); In re Hofbaure, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 
N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 
(1936); Jn re Green, 220 Pa. Super. 191, 286 A.2d 681 (1971); Weston's Adm. v. Hospital 
of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921); Jn re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 
126 P.2d 765 (1942). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979); W. PROS· 
SER, LAW OF TORTS§ 9 (4th Ed. 1971). 
The common law right for parents to make medical decisions for their children, of 
course, also rested on the property interests of the parents in the children. See Note, 
Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243 (1982), citing D. BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS 26-32 
(1971). 
23. Ordinarily, of course, the interests of the child and parents are similar, or the 
differences in their interests are not significant. 
24. See Kindregam, The Court as a Forum for Life and Death Decisions: Reflections 
on Procedures for Substitute Consent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919, 933 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Kindregam]. 
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the child is unplanned and "unwanted" by the parents,28 the parents' 
religious beliefs (e.g., which proscribe the use of medical care),27 a fail-
ure of the parents to fully understand medical treatment issues, or 
emotional problems of the parents28 may all affect the parents' medical 
decision concerning the child. 
Because parent's interests may conflict with the best interests of 
their children, the right of parents to make medical decisions for in-
fants is not unlimited. Decisions by parents to withhold necessary 
blood transfusions for religious reasons, 29 to refuse consent for their 
children to receive vaccinations against dangerous childhood diseases,30 
and to voluntarily commit their children to mental institutions31 are 
illustrative of the range of medical determinations by parents which 
are subject to some review and potential reversal. The general trend 
seems to be to provide increased review of the critical medical deci-
sions of parents. 32 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See note 29 infra. 
28. Child abuse may be representative of the extreme difference between the inter-
ests of the child and the interests of the parents. The frequency of child abuse suggests 
that parents' emotional problems and the like may often interfere with the best interests 
of the children. See In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1962). 
29. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. Kings County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 
1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); 
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 
A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Application of Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 
914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1965); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1962j. 
Courts have been willing to order blood transfusions for unborn children or even for 
mothers of unborn children. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mero. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). Cf. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding 
County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (woman was ordered to submit to a 
caesarean section if necessary to save the life of an unborn child). 
30. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 
385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); Auten v. School Bd., 83 Ark. 431, 104 S.W. 130 (1907); Board of 
Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1959), aff'd 31 N.J. 537, 158 
A.2d 330 , cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); In re Mursh, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 472, 14 A.2d 
368 (1940). Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding statute requir-
ing smallpox vaccinations for residents). 
31. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parental decision to voluntarily commit mi-
nor to a mental institution must be reviewed by an independent professional at the 
institution). 
32. Recent discussions of court intervention in lifesaving treatment for infants in-
clude Bennett, supra note 5; Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State 
Supervision of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gold-
stein]; Horan, supra note 16; Mueller & Phoenix, supra note 1; Robertson, supra note 1; 
Sokolosky, The Sick Child and the Reluctant Parent-A Framework for Judicial Inter-
vention, 20 J. FAM. L. 69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sokolosky]; Note, Protecting Chil-
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Particularly when the decision of the parents would put the in-
fant's life in unnecessary jeopardy, a strong state interest in reviewing 
the decision exists. This, of course, is consistent with the strong state 
interest in the protection of human life.ss Some courts have been even 
reluctant to permit competent adults to refuse livesaving treatment for 
themselves. s4 There has been particular concern when the refusal of 
lifesaving treatment is not being made currently by the patient him-
self. s11 "Natural death"s6 and other legislation to provide for "living 
wills,"s7 for example, routinely contain procedural and substantive 
dren from Parents Who Provide Insufficient Care-Temporary and Permanent Statu-
tory Limits on Parental Custody, 1980 AR1z. ST. L.J. 953 [hereinafter cited as Protecting 
Children From Parents]; Note, Judicial Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Med-
ical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L. REV. 1093 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Judicial 
Limitations]. 
33. Although the interest in preserving life is one of the strongest interests the state 
has, it.is generally not thought to be strong enough to prevent an adult from refusing 
treatment for himself. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972). See generally, 
Brankt, Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 
Mo. L. REV. 337 (1981); Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the 
Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (1981); Ward, Eutha-
nasia: Medical and Legal Overview, J. KAN. B.A. 317 (1980); Note, Right to Refuse 
Treatment: Under What Circumstances Does It Exist?, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 607 (1980). But 
see note 10 supra. 
34. See note 10 supra. 
35. Even when courts have permitted treatment to be withheld from incompetent 
patients they have noted the need to provide some method of assuring that these deci-
sions are appropriate or within legal standards. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown 
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 
10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 266 (1976). 
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1981); 'I'Ex. REV. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. art. 459h, §§ 1-11 (Vernon 1982). 
See Kaplan, Euthanasia Legislation: A Survey and a Model Act, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 
41 (1976); Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians' 
Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913 (1979); Note, The Right to Die: A Proposal for Natural 
Death Legislation, 49 U. CINN. L. REV. 228 (1980). 
37. One proposed model "living will" provides in part: 
B. If, due to injury or illness, sudden or gradual, I become incompetent, and my 
condition becomes such that: 
(1) I am in irreversible coma, in the opinion of the treating physician; or 
(2) I have been continuously unconscious for a period of one week and, in the 
opinion of my treating physician, I have suffered severe irreversible brain 
damage which will permanently render me incompetent; (or that even partial 
physical recovery would be accompanied by severe, irreversible brain damage 
rendering me incompetent); or 
(3) My condition is terminal and hopeless and death is imminent; 
then, as of that time, I withdraw my actual or implied consent to, and substitute 
this REFUSAL of, all further treatment of me by artificial means and devices 
(such as the use of a respirator) and all further therapeutic or emergency care; 
and I direct that all further treatment of me or my condition by such artificial 
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safeguards to protect against the wrongful withholding of lifesaving 
treatment by guardians or physicians. 38 
Despite the strong state interest in protecting the lives of infants, 
and therefore its interest in reviewing decisions to withhold treatment 
from infants, only a small percentage of such decisions are reviewed or 
brought to the attention of the state.39 It is estimated that there are 
thousands of cases each year in which physicians, with or without the 
participation and consent of parents, decide to withhold livesaving 
treatment from infants;'0 Yet there are relatively few appellate deci-
means and devices or the rendition of such further therapeutic or emergency 
care shall cease. 
Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technol-
ogy and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 839 (1980). For another 
model "living will" see Note, The Living Will: Already a Practical Alternative, 55 Tux. 
L. REV. 665 (1977). See Kutner, The Living Will: Coping With the Historical Event of 
Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 39 (1975); Roth & Wild, When the Patient Refuses Treat-
ment: Some Observations and Proposals for Handling the Difficult Case, 23 ST. Louis 
U.L.J. 429 (1979); Comment, Rejection of Extraordinary Medical Care by a· Terminal 
Patient: A Proposed Living Will Statute, 64 LA. L. REv. 573 (1979). 
38. The California Natural Death Act, for example, requires that the directive to 
withhold treatment be signed in the presence of two witnesses who are not related to or 
beneficiaries of the estate of the declarant. Such a declaration is effective for only five 
years. The form of the directive to withhold treatment is set out in the statute. CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY ConE §§ 7178-7189.5 (West Supp. 1981). 
39. It is, of course, impossible to know the percentage of decisions to withhold life-
saving treatment from infants which come to the attention of the legal system. There is 
currently no enforced requirement that such decisions be reviewed by the state, or even 
reported to the state. See notes 217-23 and accompanying text infra. 
Arguably, the failure to provide lifesaving treatment to infants could be required to 
be reported to the state under state child abuse and neglect reporting statutes. See, e.g., 
Kv. REV. STAT. § 199.335(7)(2) (Supp. 1980) which provides: 
Any physician, osteopathic physician, nurse, teacher, school personnel, so-
cial worker, coroner, medical examiner, child caring personnel, resident, intern, 
chiropractor, dentist, optometrist, health professional, peace officer, mental 
health professional or other person who knows or has reasonable cause to-believe 
that a child is an abused or neglected child, shall report or cause a report to be 
made in accordance with the provisions of this section. When any of the above 
specified persons is attending a child as part of his professional duties, he shall 
report or cause a report to be made in accordance with the provisions of this 
section. 
Id. All the states now have reporting statutes. Brown, Child Abuse: Attempts to Solve 
the Problem by Reporting Laws, 60 WOMEN LAW. J. 73 (1974); Sussman, Reporting Child 
Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1974). 
Courts have apparently not been called upon to determine whether state reporting 
statutes require such reports when physicians know that medical treatment is being 
withheld from defective infants. 
40. See, e.g., Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 26, where the following dis-
cussion is recorded: 
Senator Kennedy. • • • 
May I ask you about the magnitude of the problem. What are the numbers 
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sions dealing with these issues and no reason to believe that lower 
courts are being presented with substantial numbers of these cases:u 
Id. 
of the children that are being not treated? What numbers are we really talking 
about? 
Dr. Duff. I do not think anyone knows the answer to that question. I guess 
that our report is the first one that put a figure on the percentages of deaths that 
occurred as a result of withdrawing or withholding treatment. Our figure is 14 
percent. 
Senator Kennedy. Fourteen percent of what? 
Dr. Duff. Of deaths that occur in our unit. Fourteen percent of 299 deaths 
occurring there in the period of 2-lh years. 
Senator Kennedy. Were what? 
Dr. Duff. Were as a result of withdrawing or withholding treatment. 
Senator Kennedy. So, can you extrapolate nationally on these figures and 
reach any approximation? 
Dr. Duff. Dr. Cooke did that one time. I am not sure exactly what sort of 
figure he came up with. I am sure it was several thousand a year. 
Senator Kennedy. What would you say, Dr. Cooke? 
Dr. Cooke. I tried to figure out that if you took the number of babies you 
take care of in your intensive care nursery, and multiply it by the number of 
intensive care nurseries around the country, you would end up with probably 
several thousand. 
Senator Kennedy. Several thousand. 
Dr. Cooke. Infants which have had treatment withdrawn, and that with-
drawal has been the cause of their deaths. 
I think it is fair to point out that physicians tend toward a feeling of omnip-
otence, and whether all of those infants would have survived or not is another 
story. Some of them may well have died with treatment. 
Senator Kennedy. Can you give us any idea of that? 
Dr. Cooke. It would depend very much on the individual cases as to whether 
or not they would make it through a long period of treatment, but I would think 
that one could make a rough guess that possibly half might succumb to compli-
cations and the like along the line of usual treatment; so we are talking about a 
couple of thousand infants a year who would have survived if treatment had not 
been withdrawn. It is not a small problem by any means. 
41. A number of instances in which withholding lifesaving treatment has been 
brought to the attention of courts involve either petitions for court orders for treatment 
or criminal charges if withholding medical services leads to the death of the infant. See 
notes 1 supra, 70, 121, 148 & 206 infra; Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 9-10 
(statement of Dr. Raymond Duff). 
Infrequently a case involving withholding treatment comes to the attention of the 
public. During the 1970's two cases at Johns Hopkins received attention. In both cases 
simple surgery was refused for infants with Down's syndrome resulting in the death of 
the infants. In 1972 the New York Times Magazine reported a similar case. Ellis, Letting 
Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 399-400 (1982). More re-
cently the decision of a Bloomington, Indiana couple to refuse surgery on their infant 
child (Baby Doe) received wide publicity in the spring of 1982. The parents of the child 
refused to consent to surgery to connect the child's esophagus and stomach. The child 
died six days after birth while legal proceedings were underway. The county prosecutor 
attempted to have treatment ordered for the child. The county court refused to order the 
treatment and the Indiana Supreme Court did not overturn that decision, although the 
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Nor is it customary for other governmental agencies to review decisions 
to withhold lifesaving treatment. While Professional Service Review 
Organizations42 and other hospital review committees may review pa-
tient hospital records, these reviews often are concerned primarily with 
level and cost of treatment (overtreatment) issues. The committees 
generally do not review the legality of decisions to withhold treat-
ment. 48 Even if these committees were inclined to review decisions to 
deny treatment, they would be at best post hoc, functioning only after 
the death of the infant. Moreover, such committees lack clear criteria 
on which to make judgments about when withholding treatment is ap-
propriate and legal. 
Life and death infant nontreatment medical decisions are gener-
case did not come before the Indiana court as an appeal. The prosecutors considered 
filing criminal charges but ultimately decided not to do so. Indiana Baby's Brief Life 
Provokes Far-Reaching Questions, The Courier-Journal, April 17, 1982, at Al col. 1; No 
Charges to be Filed in Death of Baby, The Courier-Journal, April 20, 1982, at C12 col. 1. 
See also Born to Die?, The Louisville Times, May 26, 1982, at Cl, col. 5. The Indiana 
courts have continued to refuse to reconsider the case because it is moot. See The Cou-
rier-Journal, Feb. 4, 1983 at B4 col. 5. Additional details concerning the case are difficult 
to obtain because the Indiana Supreme Court sealed the records of the case. The assis-
tant administrator to the court, Karl Mulvaney, however, indicated that the infant had 
multiple serious heart defects, that a guardian ad litum had been appointed who de-
clined to join in an effort to overturn the decision to withhold treatment, and that a six 
person task force reviewed the decision not to treat and concurred with it. Personal con-
versation with Karl Mulvaney in Indianapolis, Indiana. 
Because so little is known about the details of the Baby Doe case, it is virtually 
impossible to know what standards were applied in the case. If, for example, the child 
had serious heart defects in addition to the esophageal defect the surgery required may 
have been contraindicated. The fact that a guardian ad litum was appointed and that a 
six person committee considered and approved the decision to withhold treatment sug-
gests that a significant review process was employed by the physicians, hospital or 
courts. 
42. P.L. 92-603 (1973) (amended P.L. 95-142 (1977)) established the Professional 
Service Review Organizations (PSROs) process. PSROs are charged to determine 
whether services are "medically necessary," the quality of services necessary to meet pro-
fessionally recognized standards, and whether services could be provided on an outpa-
tient basis. P.L. 92-603 § 1155(a)(l). See J. BLUM, P. GERTMAN & J. RABINOW, PSROs 
AND THE LAW (1977) and a review of the book, Ball, Review of PSROs and the Law, 22 
ST. Loms U.L.J. 534 (1978); Ball, PSRO: An Alternative to the Medical Malpractice 
System as a Quality Assurance Mechanism, 36 MD. L. REV. 566 (1977); Halvinghurst & 
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 
70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6 (1975). 
Since PSROs are authorized to establish norms of care and treatment based on pat-
terns of medical practice and immunize health care providers from failure to provide 
care beyond these norms, it is possible that PSROs might be used as a vehicle foi: vali-
dating withholding treatment from infants. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c) (1974). 
43. Some hospitals have ethics committees which may review the decision to with-
hold treatment, but such reviews are not common. Moreover, the ethical review may be 
advisory only and the committee may not have an opportunity to review the decisions 
before treatment is withheld. See note 213 infra. 
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ally quietly made by parents and physicians and seldom subject to 
outside review. Currently, therefore, enforcement of legal standards ap-
pears to be difficult, if not impossible. If a physician disagrees with the 
decision of a parent to withhold treatment, he may seek a court order 
for treatment;44 if parents discover that a physician has held back 
treatment without their consent, they may seek civil damages or even 
criminal sanctions. "11 Court review of decisions to withhold treatment, 
however, occur infrequently. Hospital personnel may discover physi-
cians and parents are withholding lifesaving treatment and indepen-
dently seek state intervention, but such action is almost unheard of. "0 
The absence of any formal review of decisions to withhold lifesav-
ing treatment from infants has meant that they are made on an ad hoc 
basis. Principles which are not acceptable to the law may be applied de 
facto in reaching these decisions. For example, if lifesaving treatment 
which is mµtinely given to normal infants is not given to mentally re-
tarded or other abnormal children, life and death treatment decisions 
would be permitted which are based on I.Q. or disfigurement.47 The 
decision not to provide lifesaving treatment is so profound that it 
should be based on principles which are clear and generally 
acceptable. •s 
B. Privacy Interests in Medical Treatment of Infants 
Two general types of potential privacy interests in nontreatment 
decisions can be identified: the interest of the parents in child rearing, 
and the interest of the infant in autonomy. The right of privacy, how-
44. The physician is generally in the best position to know when the parents are 
refusing lifesaving treatment. Presumably the physician has initiated, or asked the hospi-
tal to initiate, most efforts to obtain court ordered treatment for infants. See generally 
cases cited in note 29 supra. 
45. See w. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 
59(1) (1934); Brown & Truitt, The Right of Minors to Medical Treatment, 28 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 289, 289-90 (1979); Robertson, supra note 1, at 217-44. 
46. The Department of Health and Human Services has recently suggested that hos-
pitals may have an obligation to ensure that infants are not denied treatment based on 
physical or mental handicap (such as Down's syndrome). Failure to provide services to 
the handicapped, the Department has warned, could result in a hospital being ineligible 
for federal funding. See notes 223-36 and accompanying text infra. 
47. Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 29 (testimony of Dr. Robert E. Cooke). 
See generally RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 189-267. 
48. The principles used in making infant treatment decisions should be consistent 
with legal doctrines we are prepared to apply generally. For example, if it is proper to 
make life and death decisions based on the "value of life" of the infant or on the cost of 
the infant to the family or on the cost of treatment, then the law must be prepared to 
consider many other value of life and cost factors in life and death decisions for others as 
well. 
1982) LIFE & DEATH DECISIONS IN THE NURSERY 1139 
ever, is not absolute;'9 and a review of the right of privacy does not 
suggest that the parents have an unrestri~ted right to refuse medical 
treatment for their children. It is also doubtful that parents can exer-
cise their children's right of autonomy on behalf of their children by 
refusing treatment. Even if parents have a privacy right to refuse treat-
ment for themselves, they may not be privileged to exercise a similar 
right on behalf of their children. 
C. Autonomy Privacy 
The Supreme Court first recognized a specific constitutional right 
of privacy5° in Griswold v. Connecticut.111 In striking down a statute 
prohibiting married couples from using contraceptives112 the Court 
noted, among other things, the private nature of the relationship be-
tween a couple and their physician.118 The Justices could not agree, 
however, whether the right of privacy emanated from the penumbras 
of several constitutional guarantees,114 or was derived from the ninth1111 
or fourteenth amendments.116 
49. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
50. The historical development of the right of privacy has been documented. See 
generally Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right of Privacy, 19 VILL. L. 
REV. 833 (1974); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mice. L. REv. 219 
(1965); Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960); Henkin, Pri-
vacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest 
and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973); O'Connor, The 
Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MAss. L.Q. 101 (1968); Note, Toward a 
Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 633 
(1977); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977); Comment, Roe v. 
Wade and In re Quinlan: Individual Decision and the Scope of Privacy's Constitutional 
Guarantee, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 111 (1977). 
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 482. 
54. Id. at 484-85. The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, suggested 
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance .••. Various guarantees 
create zones of privacy. . . . The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within 
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
55. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg, while joining the opin-
ion of the Court, emphasized the importance of the ninth amendment: "To hold that a 
right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy 
in marriage may be infringed by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to 
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever." Id. at 491. 
56. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring), 502 (White, J., concurring). Justice Harlan 
stated that the proper issue was "whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic val-
ues 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (cit-
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In recognizing the right of privacy, the Court relied upon earlier 
decisions recognizing privacy-like rights, including decisions related to 
child rearing.117 In Roe v. Wade,118 the Court ultimately traced the first 
recognition of the right of privacy to its 1891 decision of Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Botsford.119 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird60 and Roe v. Wade,61 the Court again recog-
nized the right of privacy. In Roe, the Court struck down criminal 
abortion laws and clearly identified the right of privacy with the four-
teenth amendment's "concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action."62 The Court stated that "only personal rights that can be 
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' 
... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."63 It also noted 
that the right of privacy, like other fundamental rights, is not absolute 
and may be limited by narrowly drawn laws which protect compelling 
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
57. See, e.g., 381 U.S. at 482; id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg 
cited the following cases: Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (state statute 
prohibiting minors from selling merchandise in public places overrides a parent's claim 
of authority in her own household); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 
(1925) (recognizing the right to make certain decisions regarding the education of one's 
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (state law prohibiting the instruc-
tion of elementary school children in a foreign language unconstitutionally interferes 
with the power of parents to control their children's education). 381 U.S. at 495. The 
Court has acknowledged the privacy aspects of all these decisions. See Carey v. Popula-
tion Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977). 
58. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
59. 141 U.S. 250 (1891) (a court of the United States cannot order a plaintiff in a 
personal injury action to submit to a physical exam in advance of the trial). 
60. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
62. Id. at 153. Contending that the specific constitutional basis for the right of pri-
vacy was not determinative of the petitioners' entitlement to protection, the Court 
stated: 
Id. 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, 
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of 
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
63. Id. at 152. Although Justice Stewart agreed that the state laws were constitution-
ally infirm, id. at 170-71 (Stewart, J., concurring), he rejected the concept of a constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy. Id. at 167 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Crediting the 
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut for influencing his views, he premised his 
conclusion on the concept of "liberty" protected by the due process clause. Id. at 168 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, also criticized the majority's ac-
ceptance of a constitutional right of privacy. 410 U.S. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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state interests.64 The woman's right of privacy in seeking an abortion, 
for example, is not absolute and may be limited by the state when a 
compelling interest in the life of the fetus is present.611 
Although the nature and extent of the right of privacy has re-
mained far from clear,66 post Roe decisions have reaffirmed the right of 
privacy particularly as it relates to procreation and home and family 
life.67 The emphasis on family life, child rearing, and medical decisions 
in privacy law is not surprising since these decisions are among the 
most fundamental and vital that people make. The criteria for invok-
ing the right of autonomy have been suggested, and child rearing and 
lifesaving medical decisions would appear to fall squarely within the 
interests protected by such right.68 While it is apparent that parents 
have a strong privacy interest in the medical treatment their children 
receive, it is just .as clear that this privacy interest is not absolute.69 
A state interest which is legitimately compelling will justify inter-
ference with the right of privacy,70 provided the means chosen to fur-
ther the state interest is the least restrictive reasonable alternative 
available to the state. In addition, the interest of the state must be 
advanced to a greater degree than the harm inflicted upon the right of 
privacy.71 
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155-56 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460, 
463-64 (1972) (White, J., concurring)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); 
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940). 
65. 410 U.S. at 159. 
66. See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gerety, Redefining Pri-
vacy, 12 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 233 (1977); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 34 (1967); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 693 (1972); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275 (1974); Soler, 
Of Cannabis and the Courts: A Critical Examination of Constitutional Challenges to 
Statutory Marijuana Prohibitions, 6 CONN. L. REv. 601, 694-714 (1974). 
67. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1975); 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40, 648 (1974). 
68. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Privacy]. 
Id. 
To invoke the right of autonomy, an individual must satisfy three criteria: 
first, the government intrusion must invoke a vital personal interest concerning 
the most fundamental human matters; second, the government action must sig-
nificantly-not merely incidentally-interfere with this personal interest; and, 
third, either the government action must not be necessary to advance a compel-
ling state interest, or the governmental action must be more invasive of the per-
sonal interest than is required to advance the state interest. 
69. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981). 
70. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). 
71. For a more thorough evaluation of the compelling state interest doctrine, see 
Constitutional Privacy, supra note 68, at 32-41. 
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D. Privacy and Withholding Treatment 
The decisions to accept or reject lifesaving medical treatment are 
"fundamental" decisions. They involve serious questions of bodily in-
tegrity as well as the critical issue of whether the life of the person 
should continue. Few questions could be more fundamental or basic.72 
There has been a great deal of discussion concerning the state's 
interest in interfering with a decision to withhold lifesaving treat-
ment. 73 Among the most important interests of the state is the preser-
vation of life.7" This interest, as important as it is, has increasingly 
been viewed as insufficient to overcome the privacy or religious inter-
ests of a competent adult in deciding to refuse lifesaving treatment.75 
The interest of the state in preserving life may not be as strong as the 
individual's interest in being able to choose what invasive medical 
treatment he will or will not receive.76 
When the privacy interest of parents in child rearing is compared 
with the state's interest in preserving life, however, the state's interest 
is more compelling. The parents may have a right that extends to re-
fusing blood transfusions for themselves.77 That they would have a pri-
vacy right which extends to refusing a lifesaving blood transfusion for 
their infant child is less clear.78 The state has a stronger interest in 
72. The parents' privacy interest in child rearing is undoubtedly fundamental. See, 
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925). This interest pales 
when compared with a person's interest in life. A state may clearly interfere with the 
parents' non-treatment decision in order to preserve human life. See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. at 163-64, where the state's interest in preserving a viable fetus, whether or not 
defined as a "human being,'' is sufficient to justify interference with a woman's child 
bearing and bodily integrity privacy interests. At some point the state has not only the 
right, but also the obligation (e.g., due process or equal protection obligation), to protect 
the lives of wards (children). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. It has been written that 
"the right to life is the basis of all other rights and in the absence of life other rights do 
not exist." Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 367 Mass. 440, 449, 327 N.E.2d 662, 668 (1975). 
73. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 754-56, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066-67 (1978); Ra-
leigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 
537, 538, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 477-78, 181 
A.2d 751-55 (1962) (describing the criminal law consequences of withholding treatment); 
Sokolosky, supra note 32 at 72; Judicial Limitations, supra note 32, at 1113-14. 
74. See note 73 supra. 
75. See note 10 supra. 
76. See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Conn. 1965); In re 
Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Brant, supra note 15, at 340-47 
(1981). But see Application of Presidents and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). 
77. See note 76 supra. 
78. See, e.g., Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); State v. Per-
ricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Santos v. Goldstein, 16 A.D.2d 755, 227 
N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 672, 185 N.E.2d 904, 233 
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preserving the life of an individual against the choices or actions of 
another than it does in preserving the life of an individual against the 
individual's own choices. 
Central to the concept of autonomy is the idea that a person can 
choose to do things to himself that he cannot choose to do to others.79 
Even when legally empowered to make decisions for others (i.e., a par-
ent for a child, a guardian for a ward) he cannot exercise the same 
range of decisions for others as he can for himself. The state's strong 
interest in preserving the lives of children is certainly strong enough to 
justify it in interfering with the child rearing decisions of parents.80 
It might be argued that the state has a less compelling interest in 
protecting the life of a defective infant than it does a "normal" in-
fant. 81 To the extent that such a claim is based on a view of the rela-
tive value of "normal" as compared with "defective" life, the distinc-
tion appears to be inappropriate. To suggest that the state interest in 
preserving life is somehow reduced by a defect would be to alter seri-
ously the traditional legal view of the value of human life.82 If a dis-
gruntled employee of a hospital enters the nursery and stabs two in-
fants at random, and if the children die, the attacker is equally guilty 
of homicide in the death of the normal child and the severely defective 
child. The victim may not defend against a charge of killing the defec-
tive child by claiming that the state interest in protecting the life of 
the defective child is not as strong as it is in the normal child. If both 
children are only injured, but require blood transfusions to live, it 
would be anomalous to suggest that the state may properly order the 
transfusion (over parental objection) for the normal child, but not the 
defective child because the state does not have a strong interest in pre-
N.Y.S.2d 465 (1962). 
79. The full protection of autonomy interests may require that the state not assist 
the efforts of one person to interfere with the privacy rights of another. For example, the 
state cannot properly require that all minor women have their parents' permission to 
obtain an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
80. See note 78 supra. 
81. There would be no justification . • . for coercive intrusion by the 
state [in ordering treatment] in those life-or-death situations ... in 
which, even if the medical experts agree about treatment, there is 
less than a high probability that the . . . treatment will enable the 
child to pursue either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal 
healthy growth toward adulthood. 
Goldstein, supra note 32, at 653. 
82. RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 224-26; Kelsey, Which Infants Should Live? Who 
Should Decide?, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1975) (interview with Dr. Raymond Duff); 
Robertson, supra note 1, at 252-55. Cf. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 
(1967) (infant could not recover damages where doctor failed to inform mother of the 
substantial possibility of serious birth defects). 
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serving the life of the defective child. 83 
Nor does the fact that a defective infant's life expectancy is less 
than that of a normal infant necessarily reduce the state's interest in 
preserving that life. The state has a strong interest in avoiding the 
death of even the very elderly who have a short life expectancy.84 
There is no suggestion in the homicide statutes that it is less evil to kill 
a one hundred year old person than it is a thirty year old. The state's 
interest in preserving life does not appear to be reduced either by some 
perception of the value of life or the length of one's life expectancy.811 
E. Substituted Autonomy Privacy 
The question whether the state has a sufficiently compelling inter-
est to order treatment over the objections of the parents has been an-
swered in the affirmative.88 A more fundamental question has not been 
adequately examined: whether autonomy privacy has any meaning in 
medical treatment decisions regarding children. Parents, of course, 
are exercising their own privacy right in child rearing when they make 
treatment decisions for their children, but are they exercising the 
child's right of autonomy in making medical decisions for the child? 
The "substituted autonomy privacy" question may be important since 
the right of autonomy to make medical decisions for oneself seems to 
be of greater weight than the child rearing privacy interests.87 
There has been some suggestion that the right of privacy is some-
thing that can be exercised for an incompetent by a guardian. In In re 
Quinlan88 it was suggested that patients do not lose their right of pri-
83. Nor does it appear that the parents of a defective infant have a stronger privacy 
interest in child rearing than do the parents of a normal child, or parents seeking to deny 
treatment for religious reasons. 
84. It might be argued that there is a stronger interest in preventing the early death 
of an infant with a short life expectancy than there is in preventing a similarly "early" 
death for an elderly patient. There may be a decreasing marginal utility of life in the 
case of the elderly person, so that each hour of life for an infant with a short life expec· 
tancy is more valuable than an hour for the elderly person with a similar life expectancy. 
The child's opportunity to experience life (of whatever "value" or "quality") is very lim-
ited, but the elderly person has had a substantial opportunity to experience existence. Of 
course, such a theory is purely speculative; there is no way to judge the marginal utility 
of lives in these situations. 
85. While some criminal statutes determine penalties based, in part, on the age of the 
victim, see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25-130.35 (McKinney 1975) (penalties for rape 
dependent on the age of the victim), no penal law in the United States considers the age 
of the victim of a homicide as a significant factor. 
86. See cases cited in note 78 supra. 
87. Compare the cases permitting adults to refuse treatment for themselves, at note 
77 supra, with those in which they were not permitted to withhold treatment from their 
children, at note 78 supra. 
88. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In 
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vacy when they become incompetent.89 Therefore the court permitted 
a decision to refuse lifesaving treatment to be made by a guardian 
based on the patient's right of privacy. In Eichner v. Dillon, it could be 
argued that the guardian was protecting the privacy interest of the pa-
tient because he was implementing a decision which the patient had 
expressly said he hoped would be made if he were in a vegetative 
state. 90 In both Quinlan and Eichner, the patients had, in effect, made 
and expressed judgments about the medical treatment they wished to 
receive, if in a nonsapient state.91 These decisions can be viewed as 
implementing a right of privacy of the patien~. To the extent, how-
ever, that the guardians were making independent choices for the 
wards based on the wards' right of privacy, serious conceptual 
problems arise. These same problems concerning the right of privacy 
arise when the right of privacy is exercised on behalf of an infant. 
Autonomy privacy is, at its core, the right to make for oneself deci-
sions about intensely personal matters, and to make these decisions 
without substantial interference from the government. It is a right of 
self determination. 92 The right of privacy undoubtedly has other as-
pects to it, such as information privacy.93 The right to make personal 
decisions, however, is the primary focus of autonomy privacy. The 
Quinlan, the court permitted the parents of a 22 year-old woman in a nonsapient state 
to remove her from a respirator, even though it was possible that the removal would 
result in her death. 
89. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 664. 
90. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). In Eichner, Brother Jo-
seph Fox, while undergoing surgery, suffered cardiac arrest and substantial brain dam-
age, resulting in a nonsapient state from which there was no hope of recovery. Father 
Eichner sought permission to have Brother Fox removed from the respirator which was 
keeping him alive. Noting Brother Fox's wishes, expressed while he was competent, the 
court granted permission for removal from the respirator. The court expressly stated 
that it was not reaching the issue of the patient's right to privacy. Id. at 376-77, 420 
N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. See also Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 
Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (guardian may vicariously assert the rights of a comatose 
patient, including the right to refuse or discontinue medical treatment). 
91. There are serious difficulties in determining whether a patient actually would 
have refused treatment. If he or she has not clearly indicated when treatment should be 
withheld, the guardian may be speculating about what the patient would have decided 
had he or she thought about it. This "what the patient would have decided" of "substi-
tuted judgment" standard should be based on the general beliefs and values of the pa-
tient. It is, of course, impossible to apply such a standard when dealing with infants. 
They could not have developed values and beliefs upon which their decisions regarding 
treatment could be predicated. 
92. See the discussion of autonomy privacy and the criteria for applying it, notes 50-
71 supra. 
93. The Supreme Court has identified information privacy as a branch of the right of 
privacy. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). See Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457-59 (1977); Constitutional Privacy, supra note 68, at 
27-32. 
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right of privacy recognizes and gives meaning to the fact that individu-
als have different belief systems, fears, goals, feelings about the nature 
and value of life, and judgments about the quality of various aspects of 
their lives. Privacy protects the right of individuals to make important 
personal choices based on these and other highly individual factors. 
If individual choice is seen as the core of the right of autonomy, 
such right does not necessarily protect the autonomy interests of a pa-
tient to transfer decision making authority over to a guardian. The 
transfer may protect the "best interests" (e.g., physical health inter-
ests) of the ward, but 0it does not necessarily protect his autonomy in-
terests. If the guardian attempts to make decisions based on such fac-
tors as the ward's belief systems and personal feelings (as the 
guardians in Eichner and Quinlan arguably did),9' then the autonomy 
interests of the ward might be exercised by the guardian. When, on the 
other hand, a guardian uses his own values, fears and beliefs to make 
decisions for a ward, he is not protecting the ward's right of self deter-
mination or autonomy nor necessarily implementing the ward's per-
sonal feelings and choices. 
It is just as futile to talk of parents exercising the autonomy pri-
vacy interests of an infant as it is to have them exercise the religious 
interests of the infant. Parents may exercise their own privacy interests 
in child rearing and may be given the obligation of protecting the 
child. They, however, cannot exercise an independent right of the child 
to self determination because they cannot apply aU of the personal be-
liefs and feelings upon which autonomous decisions depend. Just as the 
parents could not refuse a blood transfusion based on the infant's be-
liefs as a Jehovah's Witness,911 so they also cannot refuse the transfu-
sion based on the infant's right of privacy. 
II. THE NATURE OF LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS FoR INFANTS 
Life and death decisions for infants are of greater variety and 
complexity than is often recognized. 96 Treatment decisions are not one 
dimensional. By recognizing the variety of situations which arise in-
volving life and death decisions in infants, some of the issues in with-
holding lifesaving treatment may be more easily identified. 
Three general divisions of factors involving life and death deci-
sions for infants may be suggested: (1) the status of the infant; (2) the 
action or· inaction proposed for the infant; and (3) the effects on the 
94. See notes 88-90 supra. 
95. See note 29 and accompanying text supra. 
96. Often a fair number of the complexities are considered by commentators and 
courts, at least implicitly. However, the full range of complexities and variables has 
neither been clearly identified nor fully described. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 
145-267; Horan, supra note 1; Mueller & Phoenix, supra note 1. 
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family and the family's reasons for the decision. 
A three dimensional matrix can be constructed by arraying each of 
the three general factors along an axis of the matrix. Along the hori-
zontal axis the proposed actions or inactions are presented, such as 
"Refuse Extraordinary-Experimental-Treatment," and "Refuse Ex-
traordinary-Nonexperimental-Treatment."97 Along the vertical axis are 
arranged the various statuses of the infant, ranging from a life threat-
ening condition which is fully correctable to an immediate life threat-
ening condition which is correctable plus an uncorrectable terminal 
condition. The reasons for the actions of the parents or others for re-
fusing treatment are along the third axis and include "Family Disrup-
tion or Promotion," "Financial Consideration," and "Religious 
Beliefs."98 
A relatively simple matrix is set out on page 1148. (The third di-
mension is not fully drawn.) The notes at the end of the matrix explain 
other factors which would complicate the matrix. 
"Life-Threatening" on the chart refers to a condition or disease 
which will most likely result in the death of the infant in the foresee-
able future if not treated.99 It is a correctable condition in the sense 
97. The use of an experimental/non-experimental distinction to differentiate between 
ordinary and extraordinary treatment is discussed at notes 122-26 and accompanying 
text infra. 
98. Whether the reasons for parental refusal of treatment are relevant or not may be 
debatable. It may be that the focus should be on the child and the child's need for treat-
ment, rather than on the parents' reasons for nontreatment. See Bennett, supra note 5, 
at 301-03. On the other hand, some claims to parental decision-making undoubtedly 
have a stronger basis than others, e.g., a parental decision based on first amendment 
religious rights might be given greater weight than a parental decision based solely on 
financial considerations. When life and death decisions are involved, of course, the inter-
ests of the state (and the child) in preserving life have generally been thought ,to be 
strong enough to overcome even first amendment rights and privacy rights of the par-
ents. See notes 1, 5 & 29 supra. The consequences for the family of ordering treatment 
or of the continued existence of the defective infant are also presented along the third 
axis. The extent to which the "consequence" for the family is a legitimate factor in treat-
ment decisions is considered at notes 131-38 and 167-72 and accompanying text infra. 
99. The difficulty of determining with precision whether a condition will result in 
death in the foreseeable future, and is, therefore, life threatening, is illustrated by In re 
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 
(1980). There, a 12-year old with Down's syndrome required surgery to correct a hole 
between the ventricles of his heart. Without the surgery he would suffer increasing lung 
damage which would probably result in his death within twenty years. With the surgery, 
he would have a chance for a normal life expectancy. The court refused to order the 
surgery in part because of the risks inherent in the procedure. 
Is this type of treatment lifesaving when death will not occur for perhaps another 
twenty years, but the irreversible deterioration begins immediately? It would seem that 
the direct and irreversible consequences of nontreatment in such a case justify classify-
ing the condition as life threatening. Given the severity and incontrability of the conse-
quences to the child, the court's decision is difficult to justify and has been criticized as 
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that through treatment the condition can be eliminated or improved to 
the extent that it does not present a threat of death, that the 
probability of survival is significantly improved, or that the life expec-
tancy of the infant is measurably improved.100 Examples of life threat-
ening conditions are serious bacterial infections, bowel obstructions 
and the loss of blood. 
A chronic condition is a disease or defect which is not directly life-
threatening but is not correctable101 because current medical knowl-
edge cannot substantially eliminate the problem. Chronic conditions 
are divided into physical and mental conditions.102 The infant, how-
ever, may and often does have chronic physical and mental conditions 
failing to realistically consider the child's best interests. See, e.g., Robertson, Legal As-
pects, supra note 1, at 221-22. · · 
100. In dealing with life threatening conditions, there is little difference between 
"lifesaving" treatment and "life prolonging" treatment. See Note, No-Code Orders vs. 
Resuscitation: The Decision to Withhold Life-Prolonging Treatment from the Termi-
nally Ill, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 139, 149-51 (1979). All treatment is ultimately only life pro-
longing. Therefore, using a distinction between lifesaving and life prolonging does not 
appear to be a very useful basis on which to make medical treatment decisions. To the 
extent that "life prolonging" is meant to refer to treatment which cannot ultimately fully 
cure ·a condition, such a definition would cover too wide a range of disorders, running 
from diabetes to life threatening cancers. "Life prolonging" might also refer to treatment 
which will add only a very insignificant time to the length of the patient's life. See A 
Standard for Nontreatment, supra note 1, at 624 (suggesting that treatment which 
would only extend life six months to a year should be at the option of the parents). This 
concept of "life prolonging" treatment raises issues similar to those in "terminal" patient 
treatment. See notes 173-75 and accompanying text infra. 
101. There are many conditions with which a short life expectancy is associated, al-
though they are not directly and immediately life threatening. Conditions such as these 
are considered to be chronic, although at some point the condition may be one with a life 
expectancy so short that it must be considered terminal, e.g., trisomy 13. It is not at all 
clear that the classification of a disease as terminal rather than chronic should have any 
treatment implications. 
102. The mental conditions (although they also have physical aspects) which have 
received the most attention regarding lifesaving treatment are Down's syndrome, trisomy 
13 and similar genetic defects. See, e.g., Mueller & Phoenix, supra note 1, at 502. 
Physical conditions commonly considered are myelomeningocele and spina bifida 
(an incompletely formed spinal column and exposure of the spinal column through the 
back). Id. at 502-03. There is treatment for these cases, although it is likely to be pro-
tracted and there is no assurance of success, particularly in severe cases. See Robertson, 
supra note 1, at 214. Lifesaving treatment for a child with spina bifida was ordered in In 
re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); see Lorber, Results 
of Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 13 Develop. Med. & Child Neural. 279, 300 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Lorber]; Matson, Surgical Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 42 PE-
DIATRICS 225 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Matson]; Zachary, Ethical and Social Aspects 
of Treatment of Spina Bifida, 2 LANCET 274 (1968). Jonsen points out that the most 
common medical treatment problem in the nursery is prematurity which often involves 
respiratory difficulties and brain damage. Jonsen, Ethics, the Law, and the Treatment of 
Seriously Ill Newborns, in LEGAL AND ETmcAL AsPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND 
TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 236-38 (A.E. Doudera & J.D. Peters eds. 1982). 
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simultaneously and this is recognized in the matrix.103 Chronic condi-
tions, whether physical or mental, are of varying degrees of seriousness. 
Mental retardation, for example, may be very mild or extremely 
profound. The degree or seriousness of a chronic defect is in reality a 
continuum, but because the continuum cannot be adequately 
presented in a matrix it is represented by the extremes of "mild" and 
"profound." 
A terminal condition is a life-threatening disease or defect which is 
not correctable.10• 
The first three major divisions on the vertical axis present the cir-
cumstances where lifesaving treatment decisions must be made. In the 
first column (column I), a normal child with no chronic or terminal 
(nontreatable) conditions, requires medical services. For example, a 
normal child is badly cut and requires a blood transfusion to survive. 
In the columns in the second division a child with the need for lifesav-
ing treatment (e.g., the same blood transfusion) also has another condi-
tion which is chronic and uncorrectable ranging from a mild physical 
condition (column II, 1) to profound physical and mental conditions 
(column II, 6). An example (column II, 4) is the severely mentally re-
tarded child who is cut and needs a blood transfusion. The third col-
umn refers to a child with a condition immediately life-threatening and 
who also has a terminal illness. There are, of course, a variety of termi-
nal illnesses and the life expectancies of infants with treatment availa-
ble may vary with different terminal illnesses. The matrix does not in-
clude separate categories for the various lengths of life expectancy that 
"terminal condition" includes. In one sense, of course, life is a terminal 
condition, but in the context used here terminal condition ordinarily 
suggests a very limited life expectancy, e.g., less than one year.1011 The 
life-threatening condition may or may not be related to the terminal 
illness. For example, a child with a deadly childhood cancer may re-
quire a transfusion because of a serious injury or because of the pro-
103. The presence of a chronic condition is often a critical factor in treatment deci-
sions. Infants with chronic conditions are, essentially, what is commonly referred to as 
defective newborns. See, e.g., Brant, supra note 15, at 365. The legitimacy of using a 
chronic condition as a basis for making treatment decisions is a major consideration in 
much of the rest of this article. 
104. See notes 105 & 173-75 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of terminal 
illness as it relates to treatment decisions. 
105. The one year period is arbitrary, although it has been suggested that when there 
is a life expectancy of less than one year the parents should have greater latitude in 
rejecting treatment. A Standard for Nontreatment, supra note 1, at 624. The use of the 
word "terminal" in making treatment decisions is a problem because it is often difficult 
to reliably determine whether a condition is terminal until after the subject has died. 
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979). The difficulty also arises with the 
suggestion that life expectancy of an infant is an appropriate basis on which the law may 
begin to remove its protection from infants. See text accompanying notes 173-75 infra. 
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gress of the disease. In either case the failure to provide the blood is 
likely to be fatal. 
The last two major divisions, columns IV and V, do not suggest 
situations in which lifesaving treatment is necessary. Rather, they will 
help clarify some issues regarding children similarly situated who do 
require lifesaving treatment. 108 
The horizontal rows set out the treatment decisions, or perhaps 
more accurately the nontreatment decisions, which may be made in re-
sponse to life-threatening situations. The first two major divisions, 
rows A and B, suggest the refusal of "extraordinary" and "ordinary" 
medical treatment. Although poorly defined and confusing, the ex-
traordinary/ordinary distinction is commonly used,107 and is therefore 
represented in the matrix. As the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is 
replaced by more precise concepts, these concepts would replace ordi-
nary/extraordinary in the matrix. Experimental treatments would un-
doubtedly be considered extraordinary, but there may be nonexperi-
mental, standard treatment forms such as respirators which some 
would consider extraordinary.108 Medical treatments may vary consid-
erably in terms of risk to the patient, and of the pain and discomfort 
they cause.109 Again a continuum, risk and pain in this instance, is rep-
resented by two points: the presence of and absence of substantial risk 
or pain. Row C involves the withholding of nonmedical necessities for 
life, e.g., food or water.110 
The first two or three major divisions of the horizontal rows (A, B, 
C) refer to what are often described as forms of "passive euthanasia." 
The last two or three major divisions (C, D, E) deal with what may be 
106. The clarification comes, for example, by comparing a "well" child (infant with-
out a current life threatening illness) who has a chronic uncorrectable condition, e.g., 
profound retardation (IV,2) with a similarly situated child who also has a life threatening 
illness (11,2; 11,4; or 11,6). Would it be any more appropriate to withhold treatment or 
nonmedical necessities from the child who has an easily correctable life threatening dis-
ease (11,4) than it would be to withhold nonmedical necessities from a child without the 
immediate life threatening illness (IV,2) or from an otherwise normal child who has a life 
threatening illness (V,1) or no such illness (IV,1)? 
107. The wisdom of such a distinction is considered at notes 119-50 and accompany-
ing text infra. 
108. The ordinary/extraordinary distinction probably is not commonly made on the 
basis of whether or not treatment is experimental. Respirators, although hardly experi-
mental, may be viewed as extraordinary treatment. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 48, 355 
A.2d 647, 668, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
109. The risk of death (reduced life expectancy) or substantial pain may be appropri-
ate matters to be considered in making infant treatment decisions. See notes 196-200 
and accompanying text infra. 
110. In many respects, withholding nonmedical necessities may not be substantially 
different from withholding medical neessities. See notes 190-92 and accompanying text 
infra. 
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considered types of "active euthanasia."111 Withholding nonmedical 
necessities (Row C) may be considered active or passive euthansaia. 
The fourth major division, row D, describes the application of 
treatment aimed solely at alleviating pain or suffering rather than im-
proving or curing a life-threatening condition. This pain palliation may 
be dangerous in that it may shorten the life of the infant. An example 
would be the administration of strong pain medications which might 
ultimately interfere with the cardiac centers of the child, causing death 
sooner than it would have occurred without the pain medication.112 
The final division, row E, is "Direct Euthanasia" which is taking 
direct steps, such as injecting a toxic substance into the infant, to 
cause death. It serves no medical purpose and it is different from row 
D in that it is not given as a pain palliative (although some might sug-
gest that it is the ~timate pain palliative).113 
The third dimension involves the reasons for and the conse-
quences for the family withholding treatment, and is represented in 
the upper left hand corner of the matrix. m The reasons presented are 
only illustrative of the range of reasons for withholding treatment. Par-
ents may have religious reasons for withholding treatment. For exam-
ple, they may believe that ordinary medical treatment should be with-
held because religious healing offers a better chance of curing the 
child.ms This belief is included on the chart under "Body." The par-
111. It might be argued that the "refusal of nonmedical necessities" should be con-
sidered passive euthanasia because it involves inactivity rather than talting active mea-
sures to cause death. On the other hand, passive euthanasia more commonly refers to 
withholding medical treatment. See notes 176-87 and accompanying text infra. 
Drawing a clear line between active and passive euthanasia may not be critical be-
cause there is serious doubt that it provides an appropriate legal standard in these care 
decisions. Id. 
112. See notes 199-200 and accompanying text infra. 
113. Direct euthanasia, or active euthanasia, is discussed at notes 185-88 infra. 
114. The reasons for treatment decisions are likely to be complex combinations of the 
considerations listed plus a number of other factors, e.g., the psychological dynamics of 
the parents and the advice of the physician. See Kindregam, supra note 24, at 933. 
115. In Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1947), a mother refused to 
provide medical treatment for her child because of her absolute faith in the power of 
religion to overcome disease. The court permitted custody to be transferred to a juvenile 
officer who could consent to medical treatment for the child. Furthermore, in People v. 
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903), the court upheld a conviction for willful neg-
lect in the death of a child when the parents failed to get medical help because of their 
belief in divine healing. These cases are similar to the situations in which the parents 
wish to select an unconventional therapy for a life-threatening condition when conven-
tional therapy is available. For example, in Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 
N.E.2d 1053 (1978), the court ordered that custody be transfered to the public welfare 
department so that consent could be given to conventional chemotherapy for a child 
with leukemia after the parents insisted on stopping chemotherapy and limiting treat-
ment to a special dietary plan. But see In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 
419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979) where the parents were permitted to choose to treat their child 
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ents may believe it is better that the child's life be placed in jeopardy 
rather than risking the child's, or their own, soul for violating what 
they believe to be God's commandments.116 The chart column "Soul" 
designates this belief. Treatment might also be declined by parents be-
cause it would be too expensive, or the treatment or child too disrup-
tive to the rest of the family.117 Conversely, of course, the infant, or the 
tribulations associated with treatment, may strengthen the family. The 
effect on the family and financial costs of treatment are also the conse-
quences of a treatment decision. These consequences may be impor-
tant to the extent that a broad cost/benefit analysis is used in making 
treatment decisions. m 
III. ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY DISTINCTION 
A distinction between ordinary and extraordinary medical treat-
ment has been drawn by several courts and commentators.119 The the-
ory is that one has the responsibiij.ty to accept ordinary medical care 
but not the duty to accept or provide "heroic" measures to sustain 
life.120 Presumably, heroic measures are the same as extraordinary care. 
There are several problems with using the ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction in making treatment decisions. It seems difficult to trans-
late whatever the general ordinary/extraordinary distinction means 
into practical decisions; it is difficult to define and apply. An even more 
fundamental problem is that there does not seem to be a common and 
who had Hodgkin's disease with "metabolic therapy" rather than conventional therapy. 
116. The refusal of blood transfusions is commonly of this type-the tran;fusion is 
refused because it is felt that there is a Biblical injunction against consuming blood, and 
that the risk of death is less important than the eternal risk of violating the Biblical 
injunction. See note 29 supra. 
117. It is sometimes suggested that the effect on the family is a legitimate considera-
tion in making lifesaving treatment decisions. This author's conversations with several 
infant care physicians indicate that this is, in fact, a common consideration in decisions 
to treat seriously ill newborns, particularly defective neonates. See generally Duff & 
Campbell, supra note 2; Duff & Campbell, On Deciding the Care of Severely Handi-
capped or Dying Persons: With Particular Reference to Infants, 57 PEDIATRICS 487 
(1976). 
Such an approach is not fully consistent with the "best interest of the child," a 
standard which is commonly used as the proper standard for decisions concerning in-
fants. See note 136 and acco~panying text infra. The use of "all the circumstances" 
(whether or not related to the child) standard is discussed at notes 132-40 and accompa-
nying text infra. 
118. See notes 140-41 and accompanying text infra. 
119. See, e.g., In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 
2d (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
922 (1976); Horan, supra note 1, at 82-85; Levin & Levin, supra note 1, at 568-71; Sub-
stituted Judgment, supra note 19, at 798-807. 
120. The term "heroic" is of course no more specific or clear than "extraordinary." 
1154 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
clear understanding of what the basic concept of extraordinary treat-
ment is. 
Extraordinary treatment may mean, or has been taken to mean, a 
wide variety of things. At the very least this results in the risk that the 
term will be used in one way in one instance, but mistakenly used in 
another instance to withhold treatment in a manner which suggests an 
entirely different legal concept.121 Extraordinary might mean experi-
mental, generally accepted, customary treatment under the circum-
stances, a very high cost/benefit ratio, very invasive, or treatment that 
most people would reject. m 
If extraordinary care means experimental treatment,123 then the 
justification for not requiring that a legally incompetent patient be 
given extraordinary treatment which may or may not be beneficial, 
should be viewed as a protection of the incompetent patient.124 The 
law should not impose an obligation to make an incompetent person ~ 
human guinea pig. m The interests of an infant are not, for example, 
121. A court determining that parents are justified in not consenting to experimental 
lifesaving treatment, but couching that decision in terms that parents need not accept 
"extraordinary treatment," might be mistaken by other parents to mean that treatment 
with a high cost/benefit ratio need not be accepted. The court's ruling would then have 
been expanded presumably well beyond what was initially intended. See notes 123-47 
and accompanying text infra. 
122. Other concepts also might be labeled "extraordinary." The more definitions of 
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" that are developed, the more confusing the term be-
comes. For example, in dealing with defective infants, one definition of ordinary is "those 
medical and surgical procedures that would apply in situations not involving physically 
or mentally handicapped persons." Robertson, supra note 1, at 213 n.1. 
Another definition, however, states that "[o]rdinary means all medicines, treat-
ments, and operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit ••• " and defines ex-
traordinary as "those treatments which cannot be obtained or used without excessive 
expense, pain ••• or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit." Kelly, 
The Duty to Preserve Life, 12 Tm:oL. STUDIES 550, 550 (1951). This very broad defini-
tion might presumably permit treatment with a high probability of success to be with-
held because it involves "excessive" expense or pain. 
123. Determining when a treatment is "experimental" is sometimes difficult. Pre-
scription drugs may be considered experimental if they are not approved for marketing 
by the Food and Drug Administration (i.e., if they are in Phase I, II or III of testing). 
See E. MARTIN & R. MARTIN, HAzARDs OF MEDICATION 44-49 (1978). Since Phase III in-
volves extensive clinical testing, some might consider Phase III not to be experimental. 
Determining the experimental nature of treatments not involving new drugs is par-
ticularly difficult. Those treatments might be considered experimental until there is suf-
ficient experience with them to indicate that they are effective and relatively safe. 
124. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 5, at 208-12; Bennett, supra note 5, at 326. 
125. See generally Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Diseases Research 
and Treatment, 123 PA. L. REV. 340 (1975); Bartholome, Proxy Consent in the Medical 
Context in National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, Research Involving Children 3-23-54 (1977) [hereinafter cited 
as National Commission]. 
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necessarily advanced by requiring that parents accept all the experi-
mental treatment available.128 
Ordinary care may be taken to mean generally accepted or com-
monly used treatment.127 The use of common antibiotics to cure cer-
tain bacterial infections, surgery to remove a bowel obstruction, and 
blood transfusions to replace lost blood are examples of "ordinary" 
care. On the other hand, there are some techniques or treatments 
which are not experimental because there is sufficient experience with 
their use, but which are new and not commonly accepted as standard 
treatment. Newly approved drugs often fit in this category.128 Deter-
mining whether a treatment is experimental, new, or standard and gen-
erally accepted, is not always an easy task, although these distinctions 
periodically play an important role in medical malpractice cases.129 
When treatment is lifesaving there does not appear to be strong justifi-
cation for not requiring the utilization of available treatment, even if 
new. If extraordinary means "new but not experimental," a rule requir-
ing that infants never be given extraordinary (i.e. new) lifesaving treat-
ment would not be justified.130 When no satisfactory standard treat-
126. The decision to accept lifesaving treatment that is truly experimental may then 
be seen as within the range of decisions properly left to the parents. There are, of course, 
limits on the experimentation that can be done on children even with the consent of 
their parents. When the experiment may save or prolong the life of the infant, parents 
should have broad authority to consent to experimental treatment. See National Com-
mission, supra note 125, at 73-123. 
When a life threatening condition is present and there is no conventional treatment 
available, parents will presumably accept many forms of experimental treatment as a last 
hope. 
If all experimental treatment may be withheld even in life threatening situations, it 
is probably desirable to narrowly define experimental treatment. 
127. Dowben, Prometheus Revisited: Popular Myths, Medical Realities, and Legisla-
tive Actions Concerning Death, 5 J. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & L. 250, 258-59 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Dowben]; Robertson, supra note 1, at 213 n.1. 
128. The first use of drugs following F.D.A. licensing would be an example of a new, 
nonexperimental use. Arguably, Phase ill testing of a drug (broad clinical testing prior 
to licensing) would also fit in this category. See E. MARTIN & R. MARTIN, HAZARDS OF 
MEDICATION 45-49 (1978). 
129. See generally Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 CaL App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Fortner v. 
Koch, 312 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935). See note 121 supra. 
130. But see In re Green, 12 CRIME & DEL. 377 (Child. Ct., Milwaukee County, Wisc., 
March 18, 1966). 
When action is necessary to save a life, the fact that a treatment is new does not 
seem to justify refusing such treatment at least as long as it is not experimental. This 
does not, however, suggest that the parents are completely free to accept a "new" treat-
ment as opposed to a widely accepted conventional therapy. See Custody of a Minor, 375 
Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978). But see In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 
1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979). A treatment might be considered "new" if it has substan-
tial scientific support even though it ha,s not received sufficiently wide aceptance to be 
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ment is available and the result of nontreatment is death, the risks 
inherent with a new (but nonexperimental) treatment are generally go-
ing to be dramatically lower than the risk of nontreatment (death). 
Extraordinary might instead refer to care not customarily given to 
patients for a disorder under the circumstances presented by this pa-
tient.181 Unlike the previous definition, circumstances other than a life-
threatening medical condition may be taken into account. The other 
"circumstances" which would be considered might be limited to the 
physical and mental condition of the patient, or it might be broad and 
include the family, social and economic circumstances of the patient.182 
Under this definition what is ordinary for one patient might be ex-
traordinary for another with the same medical condition. Consider, for 
example, surgery to correct an infant's bowel obstruction, a standard 
procedure. Utilizing this definition of extraordinary care, such treat-
ment might be required to be given to the normal infant. The same 
surgery on another infant who is retarded or deformed and whose fam-
ily cannot cope with his condition and the needed medical treatment, 
might not be required.133 One difficulty with this concept of extraordi-
nary is that the "circumstances" which may be legitimately considered 
are not identified.184 The circumstances might reasonably be limited to 
factors which make the surgery medically unsound (e.g., the infant 
would surely die from the trauma of surgery) or futile (e.g., the infant 
considered the standard treatment. 
It has been suggested that parents should be permitted to legally refuse lifesaving 
treatment if the parents "are confronted with conflicting medical advice about which, if 
any, treatment procedure to follow." Goldstein, supra note 32, at 653. One of the difficul-
ties with such a standard is that it would appear to prevent courts from ordering medical 
treatment to save the life of an infant if any medical authority, even a very limited 
minority of the profession, is at odds with the overwhelming majority of medical author-
ity. See In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979). 
131. See generally In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 48, 355 A.2d 647, 668, cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 992 (1976). 
132. Strong arguments against using such factors are presented in RAMSEY, supra 
note 5, at 201-08. It is not possible to tell how frequently family, social and financial 
factors play a major role in nontreatment decisions. See Medical Ethics Hearings, supra 
note 2, at 5-7. 
133. Such a case arose in Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145, (Super. Ct., 
Cumberland County, Me. Feb. 13, 1974), reported in Brant, supra note 15. Because the 
parents of a defective newborn refused to consent to heart surgery, the court made the 
infant a ward of the state and ordered surgery. 
134. As indefinite as this definition of "extraordinary" may seem, it is a model of 
clarity when compared to the definition contained in the North Carolina Natural Death 
Act. That statute provides that "'[e]xtraordinary means' is defined as any medical proce-
dure or intervention which in the judgment of the attending physician would serve only 
to postpone artificially the moment of death by sustaining, restoring, or supplanting a 
vital function." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(2) (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis 
added). Presumably the purpose of most medical treatment is to interfere with natural 
forces and thereby "artificially postpone" death. 
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will die at about the same time from another condition which is un-
treatable).1311 It may, however, permit factors to be considered in mak-
ing the nontreatment decision, which are arguably unacceptable (e.g., 
some perception of the quality of life) or not necessarily in the best 
interest of the child (e.g., financial or family considerations)138 Another 
problem with this definition is that it requires the medical community 
to define by custom what is essentially a legal or social issue with med-
ical aspects: when may lifesaving treatment be legally withheld? This 
is a question of the legal rights of infants and children, not one of med-
ical science.137 Because this definition relies on medical custom it is 
critical to know what medical custom is. This, however, may be diffi-
cult to determine with any precision in many circumstances.138 
"Extraordinary" care might also be taken to mean care in which 
the costs are greater than the benefits. A cost/benefit analysis of ex-
traordinary which would consider whether the costs are greater than 
the benefits, poses problems similar to those involved in the "under the 
circumstances" definition.139 The delineation of the proper costs and 
benefits to be considered becomes central, but difficult since one must 
look at whether all "costs" to the family, the doctors, and society 
should be considered or only costs to the child.140 In addition, of 
course, it is difficult to recognize all of the benefits when dealing with 
an infant and impo~sible to realisticf111y weigh them. Even using the 
135. In practice it is virtually impossible to predict when another condition will cause 
death in the immediate future. Homicide is ultimately, of course, nothing more than 
"shortening life." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35, at 250 
(1972). A medical-feasibility standard which would allow lifesaving treatment to be with-
held if life expectancy is short is also dangerous. Since the decision to terminate treat-
ment is irreversible, the medical prognosis must be made with a high degree of certainty. 
Although it would appear to diminish the degree of certainty, some commentators have 
suggested extending the boundaries of the definition of "imminent death" to six months, 
a year, and even longer. See A Standard for Nontreatment, supra note 1, at 624. 
136. The best interest of the child is the standard which is commonly a matter of 
statute and decision. Finloy v. Finloy, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); A. FREUD, J. 
GOLDSTEIN & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973). 
137. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, the decision of a woman 
to have an abortion may have a substantial medical component, but her right to do so is 
properly a question for the legal system. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 143 (1973). 
138. Medical customs, often difficult to establish, usually play a central role in medi-
cal malpractice cases. For an excellent consideration of the problems inherent in relying 
solely on medical custom in establishing an appropriate standard of care, see Helling v. 
Carey, 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). See also Keeton, Medical Negligence-The 
Standard of Care, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 351 (1979); King, In Search of a Standard of 
Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 
1213 (1975); Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 
528 (1976). 
139. See notes 131-35 and accompanying text supra. 
140. See notes 152-70 and accompanying text infra. 
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very interesting analysis process proposed by Wesley Sokolosky141 it 
would be extremely difficult to perform such an analysis in infant non-
treatment decisions in a way that would provide a consistent definition 
of extraordinary and would eliminate nonlegitimate considerations 
from the decision.142 
The broad cost/benefit analysis has a superficial utilitarian appeal. 
Making life and death decisions based in part on whether the death of 
one person would be good for others, however, has not generally been 
the basis for legal decisions. The "best interests of the child" has been 
the prevailing standard in child treatment and custody cases. Under a 
broad cost/benefit approach standard, life and death decisions would 
be determined by considering the best interests of the family and of 
the state. However, including the avoidance of emotional or financial 
problems ("costs") to another in the best interests of the family or 
state, would substantially alter the law's emphasis in the sanctity of 
life and the individual. Allowing life to be terminated involuntarily to 
avoid nonlife-threatening harm to others would establish a dangerous 
principle which could not necessarily be limited in its application to 
defective children. 
Ordinary treatment might also be defined in terms of what treat-
ment the average person would want to have if he were in a similar 
position.143 There is some difficulty, of course, in determining what the 
average person would want in terms of treatment. A Gallup poll on the 
issue might be fascinating but of little value given the number of vari-
ables involved. Even information about what treatment the average 
person would want for himself might be of limited value in deciding 
what to do when treatment is required for an infant with a life-threat-
ening disease, particularly if the infant has another serious chronic 
condition. This is a situation which is not a part of the experience or 
even reasonable imagination of most people. Even speculating as to 
what one would want in such circumstances is difficult and unreliable. 
Extraordinary might be taken to mean "extremely invasive."m An 
141. Sokolosky, supra note 32. Sokolosky has suggested an approach to treatment 
decisions based on Bayes' theorem, aimed at ensuring that all relevant factors are con-
sidered. All alternative courses are clearly defined, the risks and benefits, including the 
likelihood and desirability of each alternative are established and the alternatives are 
compared. Id. at 85-95. This process requires that numerical values be assigned to the 
likelihood of an outcome or event, and to the consequences of proposed treatment or 
nontreatment. Id. at 86-87. 
142. Sokolosky recognizes that the "difficulty establishing a numerical probability or 
desirability for any given consequence of a medical treatment alternative would limit its 
[Bayes' theorem approach] usefulness." Id. at 86. 
143. One court has noted that the fact that most people would accept the proposed 
treatment may be a relevant factor in determining "ordinary treatment." Superintendent 
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (Mass. 1977). 
144. See In re Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Brant, supra 
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extremely invasive procedure might be defined as one which requires 
substantial, extensive, and perhaps long term, interference or manipu-
lation of the body accompanied by great pain and discomfort.1411 With-
holding extraordinary treatment in this sense might be based on the 
proposition that there are some proposed forms of treatment that will 
be accompanied by so much pain, discomfort and interference with the 
body that even lifesaving treatment is not worth the suffering.146 This 
definition of extraordinary depends upon a situation where pain or dis-
comfort may overwhelm any opportunity to enjoy or appreciate life.147 
Extraordinary treatment might refer to such a variety of different 
concepts that it cannot legitimately be used in making nontreatment 
decisions for infants or other legally incompetent patients. Some of the 
concepts which may be included in extraordinary are unclear and vir-
tually impossible to apply consistently,m or are open to interpreta-
tions permitting treatment to be withheld in circumstances which are, 
at the very least, arguably unacceptable.149 Therefore, the use of ex-
traordinary by courts and commentators is confusing and dangerous. 
Since it may mean different things, the approval of the use of the con-
cept in making treatment decisions may be expanded well beyond what 
is intended by a forum using it.1110 The use of extraordinary treatment 
confuses the debate regarding withholding treatment and should be 
eliminated and replaced by a term or phrase more clearly identifying 
the idea intended. 
IV. STANDARDS FoR NoNTREATMENT DECISIONS 
. 
The Decision Matrix demonstrates not only the complexity of in-
fant care decisions, but also a number of the factors or standards which 
might be applied in making lifesaving treatment decisions. 1111 In this 
note 15, at 366. 
145. See generally Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary 
Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 701 (1980) (dis-
cussion of the constitutional limits of involuntary treatment). 
146. See Brant, supra note 15, at 344-47. 
147. See Substituted Judgment, supra note 19, at 798-99. See also notes 195-217 and 
accompanying text infra. 
148. See, e.g., notes 127 & 141 and accompanying text supra, and the discussion of 
"generally acccepted" and "cost/benefit" as defining terms of extraordinary treatment. 
149. See notes 195-217 and accompanying text infra. 
150. See note 121 supra. 
151. Sokolosky has suggested that a matrix based on Bayes' theorem could be con-
structed in infant treatment cases to compare the desirability of alternative treatments 
and nontreatment. Sokolosky, note 141 supra. Ellis has suggested that legislatures con-
struct a treatment matrix as part of the process of defining situations in which treatment 
may be withheld from infants. The matrix proposed by Ellis lists specific infant medical 
conditions along one axis and the nature and consequences of the treatment/nontreat-
ment along the other axis. Ellis, note 141 supra at 418-20. 
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section these factors are considered to determine if there are any rea-
sonable bases upon which infant treatment decisions can be made. 
A. Normal and Abnormal Infants 
One essential issue posed by the matrix is whether otherwise nor-
mal infants with life-threatening conditions should be treated differ-
ently than children with the same condition who are in addition physi-
cally or mentally abnormal; or in other words, whether it is proper to 
draw treatment distinctions between infants based on a condition of 
the child not directly related to the life-threatening disease. In addi-
tion, the question is raised whether it matters that the abnormality is 
profound or mild. Much of the quality of life discussion collapses to 
these kinds of questions.1112 Recall the situation posed earlier where 
simple surgery to remove a bowel obstruction is required by an in-
fant.1113 Death, often occurring after a long and painful period of time, 
is the almost certain result of nontreatment. Suppose one of the in-
fants is normal, one has been born without legs, and another is a pro-
foundly retarded baby. We may assume that the law would require 
that the first child be given treatment to save its life. But should the 
second child or the third child be treated differently because of the 
abnormalities?1114 
Permitting life and death decisions to be made on the basis of 
physical or mental capacities is a position that our law has not tradi-
tionally taken and should not adopt.m It raises the most serious pol-
icy, and even constitutional, issues.1116 There appear to be two ratio-
152. Issues regarding the position of the infant relative to his family and the burden 
placed on the family and society may also play a role in these decisions. See notes 130-41 
and accompanying text supra and notes 168-70 and accompanying text infra. 
153. See note 133 and accompanying text supra. 
154. The question may also be stated in terms of parental autonomy: may the family 
in one instance be permitted to withhold lifesaving treatment (e.g., where the child is 
severely retarded), while the family with a normal child is not permitted to withhold the 
same treatment? The issue is whether the existence of even profound mental retardation 
is a basis on which the state should remove its protection of life. 
155. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 
N.E.2d 417 (1977), for example, the court noted that it was improper to consider the 
"value" of life in making treatment decisions. Id. at 760, 370 N.E.2d at 432. The court 
did, however, permit a reduction in the quantity of life to avoid a significant loss in the 
quality of the life remaining. Id. 
The suggestion has been made that the selection of patients for treatment is a sub-
stituted judgment about the quality of life. Substituted Judgment, supra note 19, at 
797-98. A decision to treat in every case may not represent a decision about the quality 
of life. It may represent, however, a decision that the quality of life is too speculative or 
too dangerous a concept to play a legitimate role in making such decisions. 
156. Fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process issues come to mind. 
When nontreatment will result in death, for the law to require treatment for normal 
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nales for permitting the refusal of treatment to an abnormal child 
which would be required for a normal child: (1) the life of the child is 
not worth living because of the abnormality; and (2) the burden placed 
on the rest of society (e.g., the family, hospital, financial institutions) 
by the continued existence of the child is not worth the life itself. In 
either case it is not a decision about treatment that is being made so 
much as it is a decision whether to take advantage of the fortuitous 
presence of a life-threatening disease to cause the death of the infant. 
Terminating or permitting the termination of another's life be-
cause of a feeling that the life is not worth living poses very serious 
dangers.1 t17 It rests on the assumption that reasonable judgments about 
the quality of another's life can be made, and the assumption that the 
life of an abnormal child is less acceptable or meaningful than that of a 
normal child to the point that allowing or causing the death of the 
abnormal child is justified.1t1s The tradeo:ff is not between the "quality 
children but not defective children suggests a rule of profound consequences based upon 
mental retardation or physical deformity. Cf. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 
(D.D.C. 1972) (failure of school board to provide special education to mentally retarded 
and emotionally disturbed children violates fourteenth amendment). 
There does not appear to be any strong state interest to support different treatment 
on the basis of physical or mental condition. See generally Sherlock, Selective Non-
Treatment of Newborns, 5 J. MED. ETHICS 139 (1979); Sherlock, Selective Non-Treat-
ment of Newborns: A Critique, 7 J. MED. ETHICS m (1980). 
157. "Slavery, witchhunts and wars have all been justified by their perpetrators on 
the grounds that they held their victims to be less than fully human." Bok, Ethical 
Problems of Abortion, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33, 41 (Jan. 1974). Tooley's suggestion 
that equal treatment need only apply to those with a capacity for a "sense of self'' is 
dangerous in that the right to treatment would be subject to the definition of a "sense of 
self." Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 37, 49 (1972). Having 
adopted this concept of equal protection one needs only to determine how to define 
"concept of self'' in the proper way to remove the protection of law from many groups. 
The state's interest in avoiding unnecessary expenses of caring for defective, as opposed 
to normal, infants does not appear to be strong enough to justify the normal/defective 
distinction in treatment decisions. The protection of parental interests in decision-mak-
ing seems no stronger in the case of a defective child than for a normal child. The medi-
cal community's interest in not having to treat or associate with defective infants does 
not seem adequate to draw these life and death distinctions. For a discussion of state 
interests in these decisions, see Bennett, supra note 5; Sokolosky, supra note 32, at 72-
73; Judicial Limitations, supra note 32, at 1113-14. 
158. The judgment is actually between a life which is less than normal and no life at 
all. The degree to which this can be taken is illustrated by Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 
2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). In Zepeda, an illegitimate child sought damages from his 
biological father for having caused his birth, suggesting that it would be better never to 
have been born than to be born illegitimate. While the court denied relief in deference to 
the legislature's role of establishing this type of tort action, it did recognize the validity 
of the child's argument. Id. at 243, 190 N.E.2d at 853. If the Zepeda child had needed 
lifesaving treatment at birth, could the mother appropriately refuse the treatment be-
cause it would be better for the infant not to survive than to survive as an illegitimate 
child? That illegitimacy might be thought to be sufficient to make "no life at all" better 
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of life"1G9 and "quantity of life"160 or the giving up of some length of 
life to obtain a more active and happier, albeit shorter, life.161 Often 
the choice in these decisions is between continuing a life of uncertain 
or unknown quality and bringing an end to the life without increasing 
the quality of life. 
In fact, we often do not know enough about the quality of the life 
of a defective newborn to make these judgments. Some may view the 
quality of life prospects for a child born to a large, uncaring family 
living in poverty to be quite limited, but it does not seem proper to 
withhold lifesaving treatment on that basis.162 Yet it is not clear that 
the quality of life of a profoundly mentally retarded infant is any less 
than it is for the other child. There is such a variety of views about 
what is valuable in life that it is unlikely that there could be any agree-
ment on what was "valuable" even if we could fully understand what a 
defective child was experiencing or going through.163 
Consider the most extreme form of mental abnormality, 
anencephaly.164 It might be argued persuasively that human life re-
quires consciousness of higher brain activity which children with 
anencephaly do not possess and therefore that they are not really 
alive. m A definition of life requiring the presence of higher brain ac-
tivity is not consistent with the current brain death standards in which 
any brain activity is enough.166 The real point regarding the perma-
than "living" demonstrates the potential range of the "life worth living" decisions. 
159. See Hyde, note 19 supra. 
160. Id. at 1088. 
161. There are circumstances in which a legitimate tradeoff is called for between the 
quality of life and quantity (length) of life. See notes 185-89 and accompanying text 
infra. 
162. Some may view the prospects of life in the current world as very bleak. A psy-
chiatrist relates that he has seen a patient who was very caring and even loving toward 
his child. At the same time the psychiatrist believed that there was some danger that the 
patient might try to kill the child to protect the child from the great pain and suffering 
associated with living. It was difficult for the patient/father to understand what pleasure 
the child may find in life. In a different way, it is difficult for us to appreciate what the 
life of a defective newborn is like. But the perspective from which we view the value of a 
life may be considerably different from the one actually experiencing the life. See People 
v. McQuiston, 12 Cal. App. 3d 584, 90 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1970). The defendant killed his 
two normal children. He described it as a mercy killing which he would repeat because 
he believed they would be better off dead than to continue living with their mother dead 
and their father in prison. 
163. See Hyde, note 19 supra. 
164. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. 
165. See note 16 supra. 
166. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of 
Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968). The use of the 
brain death standard is detailed in note 15 supra. See also A Collaborative Study, An 
Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral Death, 237 J.A.M.A. 982 (1977); Ad Hoc Commit-
tee of the American Electroencephalographic Society on EEG Criteria for Determination 
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nently unconscious patient (e.g. the anencephalic) is not that he has a 
low quality of life, but that he has no life at all. Thus the issue is the 
definition of human life, not of treatment. · 
It is also unacceptable to withhold treatment from infants to cause 
death when the basis for withholding treatment is, in part, the negative 
financial, social or economic impact the infant will have on the family 
or others. The proposition that one person's life should be ended by 
others to avoid potential social or economic harm is contrary to the 
most fundamental concepts of individual rights and protection central 
to our laws and constitution.167 It would surely be unacceptable as a 
general rule of law and there seems to be no legitimate reason to apply 
such a principle to defective infants.168 Some suggest, perhaps unfairly, 
of Cerebral Death, Cerebral Death and the Electroencephalogram, 209 J.A.M.A. 1505 
(1969). See generally Abram, The Need for Uniform Law on the Determination of 
Death, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1187 (1982). 
167. These predictions and calculations involved the value of the child's life with a 
defect versus a quick end to life, the life expectancy of the infant, and the effect of the 
infant's life or death on the family. These factors, in addition to the relative value (cost/ 
benefit) of each effect, the financial impact on a family or a hospital of treating the 
infant, and the tradeoffs between these factors are not possible for physicians and other 
interested parties to determine. 
"H physicians are going to play God under the pretense of providing relief for the 
human condition, let us hope they play God as God plays God." RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 
203. 
168. The fact that a continuation of treatment will socially or financially harm others 
does not appear to be a strong basis for state sanctioning of invasive, let alone life 
threatening, action. In comparison, parents who wish to have a minor committed to a 
mental hospital, not for the benefit of that child, but for some general benefit to other 
children, could not have the child involuntarily committed. Most states require mental 
illness and serious danger to others to justify involuntary commitment. See Suzuki v. 
Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980); A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAw: A SYSTEM 
IN TRANSITION 47-51 (1975); Developments, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 
HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1201-07 (1974); Note, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional 
Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 
562 (1977). Even voluntary commitment of a child requires more than just the consent of 
the parents. An independent decision-making process is needed, although this need not 
be in the form of an adversary or judicial proceeding. An independent medical and psy-
chiatric investigation will protect children who should not be admitted. See Parham v. J. 
R., 422 U.S. 584, 613 (1979). 
Even when the benefit is saving the life of another at the cost of physical invasion 
involving limited risk to a child or incompetent adult, courts have only reluctantly con-
sented to kidney transplants. The situation arises when a child or incompetent is the 
only compatible donor so that if consent to donate the kidney is refused, the patient, 
often a brother or sister, will probably die. Even when the courts have sanctioned a 
guardian's approval of the transplant, they have done so reluctantly, often by finding 
that the transplant is really in the best interest of the incompetent donor. Hart v. 
Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 
1969). Other courts have refused to permit the transplant to occur. In re Richardson, 284 
So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1973); In re Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975). Hit is 
improper to permit a kidney transplant donation to save the life of another, it appears to 
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that such decisions raise the spectre of Nazi treatment of life.169 
Should the principle be established that treatment may be refused for 
infants when their lives are too costly to others, there would be no 
strong reason not to apply the same principle broadly, to the mentally 
ill, the seriously handicapped, the elderly infirm, and so on. 
The calculation of the value of an infant's life and the negative 
consequences of life to others becomes very complex and extremely 
speculative.170 It in part requires a prediction of the "net utility" 
(broadly defined pleasure, less displeasure) that the infant will exp'eri-
ence from life, and that this be calculated on the basis of how the in-
fant himself will perceive this pleasure and pain; and finally that the 
infant's predicted net utility be compared with the predicted pleasure 
and pain the infant will bring to the family and any number of other 
individuals viewed, again, from their perspectives. This calculation is, 
of course, so speculative as to be impossible. In part it is this kind of 
speculation that makes a "too costly to society" principle dangerous. 
Without any reliable information on which to make these decisions, 
they are made on the basis of hunches, fears, suspicions and prejudices 
and often a feeling that lives substantially different from our own are 
imperfect. These are generally inappropriate bases on which to make 
life and death decisions and may oftep. cause us to undervalue consid-
erably the lives of those who are different. 
The speculative nature of quality/cost of life decisions might be 
viewed as a reason to leave this calculation within the sphere of paren-
tal childrearing decision-making; when we cannot predict with cer-
tainty what is in the best interest of the child or the family, we should 
leave it tO the parents to decide. To one degree or another, of course, 
the future quality of life of any child is uncertain and speculative. The 
degree to which that uncertainty increases in abnormal children is far 
from clear; many Down's syndrome children are said to be quite happy, 
for example. While uncertainty about the future of a child or the desir-
ability of some forms of treatment does create substantial latitude in 
the family, it does not create a general power in the family to withhold 
treatment when that would cause the child's death, even when the 
family claims to be acting in what they perceive to be the broadest best 
·interests of the child. A parental decision that it is better for a child to 
die for lack of blood than to violate God's commands by accepting a 
be improper to cause the death of an infant to avoid social or financial burdens to the 
family. But see R. Veatch, Guardian Refusal of Life-Saving Medical Procedures, unpub-
lished manuscript cited in Substituted Judgment, supra note 19, at 803 n.96. See note 
192 infra. 
169. Medical Ethics: Hearings, supra note 2, at 7 (testimony of Dr. Raymond Duff). 
170. See Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. 
REV. 350, 356-58 (1954); but see Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 7-8 (state-
ment of Dr. Raymond Duff). 
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transfusion cannot be supported on the basis of the uncertainty or 
speculative nature of what is in fact in the long term best interests of 
the child. Nor could a decision be upheld to withhold a transfusion 
because the parents believe that a child's life will not be worth living 
due to a missing limb. Furthermore, the parents of defective infants 
may be in a particularly bad position to make speculative quality or 
cost of life calculations when life and death decisions are involved; they 
may have conflicting interests or emotionally be unfit to make the 
decisions.171 
The law cannot accept, as a basis for denying lifesaving treatment, 
the claim that a child will not have a life worth living or that the child 
will have negative social or economic effects on the family. The utiliza-
tion of mental or physical abnormality as a basis for making life and 
death decisions is inconsistent with the belief that human life should 
be protected without regard to status, form or defects.172 To make de-
cisions for others based on the quality of life or social and economic 
costs to others establishes a most dangerous principle. It is at odds 
with our most basic concepts of individual rights and freedoms, it in-
vites abuse, and it is basically impractical because it requires the calcu-
lation of the net utility of the lives of others in a way which is so spec-
ulative as to be impossible. 
171. See notes 241-43 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of parental deci-
sion-making. 
172. On this point the medical and legal systems seem to be diverging. Medical opin-
ion appears to be moving in the direction of approving the withdrawal of treatment with 
the purpose of causing death in light of the expected quality of life, broadly d~fined to 
include effects on those close to the patient. This viewpoint was emphasized by Dr. War-
ren Reich in his testimony before the Congress: 
[T]here is growing within the medical profession a quality of life ethic according 
to which only those who have the capability of a meaningful life deserve protec-
tion and the requirements for a meaningful life seem to be constantly expanding 
to include such qualities as self awareness, self-direction, substantial use of one's 
faculties, social relatedness and so forth. 
Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 30 (statement of Dr. Warren Reich). In con-
versations with physicians about withholding treatment the "quality of life" was rou-
tinely used as an important criterion for making infant nontreatment decisions. See Duff 
& Campbell, supra note 2, at 890. 
On the other hand, contemporary legal authorities often reject quality or value of 
life, especially when broadly defined, as a basis for treating or not treating infants and 
incompetents. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 
728, 754, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (1977), the court rejected quality of life as the basis for 
withholding treatment of a mentally retarded adult. See Maine Medical Center v. Houle, 
No. 74-145 (Super. Ct., Cumberland Co., Me. Feb. 13, 1974), reported in Brant, supra 
note 15, at 366 n.150; Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Robertson, 
supra note 1, at 252-55; A Standard for Nontreatment, supra note 1, at 620-23. 
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B. Terminal Illnesses 
Children with terminal illnesses may present different considera-· 
tions.173 Treatment for a correctable life-threatening condition may be-
come futile in that the terminal illness is likely to cause death before, 
or at about the same time as the treatable condition would if left un-
treated. Terminal illnesses may also make common treatment for other 
generally treatable conditions impossible, or very risky, or extraordina-
rily painful. 174 The fact that an infant has a terminal condition should 
not, in and of itself, justify all refusal of treatment, nor does it justify 
routinely treating children who have a chronic uncorrectable condition 
as well as a terminal condition any differently than "normal" children 
with terminal diseases.175 
C. Active and Passive Euthanasia 
The horizontal rows of the Decision Matrix may be broadly di-
vided into active176 and passive177 euthanasia with the refusal of treat-
ment, and perhaps nonmedical necessities, being passive euthanasia. 
The difference between active and passive euthanasia is essentially 
based on the distinction between action and inaction .. Broadly defined, 
passive euthanasia is death caused by inaction.178 Active euthanasia is 
taking direct action which causes death.179 While there has been some 
173. In re Green, 12 Crim. & Rel. 377 (Ct. Milwaukee County, Wis. March 18, 1966), 
reported in Brant, supra note 15, at 366 n.150. It has, however, been suggested that 
"terminal" is not a concept that can be used in making medical decisions because the 
term cannot be defined with any accuracy. United States v. Rutherford, 422 U.S. 544, 
556 n.14 (1979). 
174. See notes 195-200 and accompanying text infra. 
175. "Terminal" illness or condition plays a role in some natural death statutes. See 
notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra. California, New Mexico, Texas and other 
states, require that the patient's condition be terminal before a life-support system is 
removed. Terminal is not defined, however, leaving a substantial ambiguity in the 
legislation. 
176. By definition, active euthanasia would include row E, the administration of di-
rect euthanasia. The administration of pain palliative measures, row D, would probably 
also be included when these measures are likely to have the effect of shortening life, even 
though their purpose is to improve the quality of life that remains. Some also view the 
withholding of nonmedical necessities, row C, as active euthanasia. Even though row C 
involves inaction, the duty to provide basic food and water is clearly established. As this 
section of the article suggests, the author sees no strong reason to treat the withholding 
of nonmedical necessities any differently from the withholding of lifesaving treatment, at 
least that lifesaving treatment which does not involve extensive severe pain. 
177. Passive euthanasia includes the withholding of medial treatment, whether ex-
traordinary or ordinary (rows A and B), and perhaps withholding nonmedical necessities 
(row C). 
178. See notes 202-07 and accompanying text infra. See generally Abrams, Active 
and Passive Euthanasia, 53 PHILOSOPHY 257 (1978). 
179. Id. 
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support for passive euthanasia, 180 there has been little support for ac-
tive euthanasia, at least as it relates to infants.181 Superficially, at least, 
the action/inaction distinction seems to be based on the traditional le-
gal concept that one may legally permit something to happen even 
when it would have been illegal to cause it to happen.182 Even in life-
threatening situations one may be permitted to refuse to rescue an-
other when the rescue could be accomplished safely and easily.183 The 
action/inaction distinction starts to break down, however, when one 
has a duty to care for another.184 A parent, for example, would proba-
bly not have the privilege of refusing to rescue his or her child from a 
swimming pool when the rescue could be accomplished without risk. 
The active/passive euthanasia distinction appears to be somewhat 
artificial in many infant care decisions. Where care is refused for the 
purpose of causing death and when death is virtually certain to result 
from the refusal of treatment there seems to be no real difference be-
tween withholding treatment and taking direct action to cause 
death.185 The decision to withhold treatment is being made by those 
responsible for the care of the child and the failure to provide for med-
ical care necessary to sustain life is a breach of the duty of care.186 
180. See Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999 (1967); Levin & Levin, 
supra note 1, at 572-74. 
181. This type of active euthanasia may be viewed as infanticide. See note 214 and 
accompanying text infra. But see Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975). 
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 315 (1965). 
183. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 340-48 (4th ed. 1971). 
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A(4), 320 (1965). See Frankel, Criminal 
Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 367 (1965); Perkins, Negative Acts in 
Criminal Law, 22 IowA L. REV. 659 (1937). 
185. The distinction between action and inaction in lifesaving or life prolonging 
treatment has received strong support. Horan, supra note 1, at 76 (quoting Louisell, D., 
1972 Pope John XXIII guest lecturer, Catholic University Law School). 
It is difficult to see the value of the distinction when the almost certain result of 
inaction is death. The concept of "letting nature take its course" (e.g., letting an un-
treated infection or bowel obstruction cause the death of an infant) suggests that it is 
appropriate to permit death to occur by inaction (natural causes) when it would be inap-
propriate to directly cause death. As a general principle, however, this broad "let nature 
take its course" proposition is unacceptable. We surely are not willing to "let nature take 
its course" by letting an infant starve to death, nor drown if he or she fell into a lake 
alone, nor freeze to death by letting an infant wander into the elements. In fact, we are 
not prepared to let nature run its course by refusing to treat a serious infection with 
antibiotics if the infant is normal. The principle being proposed then must be more in 
the way of letting nature run its course (cause the death of an individual) through inac-
tion when the individual is one who we perceive not to have a worthwhile life and when 
the inaction is the withholding of medical treatment. 
186. Of course, there still remains the question of what the extent of that duty ought 
to be. For example, should it extend to providing experimental care, or customary care, 
or noninvasive care? 
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Indeed, a parent who knowingly refuses to provide an antibiotic to cure 
a life-threatening infection and intentionally causes the death of the 
child, may be criminally liable.187 
If, arguendo, a parent does not have a duty to provide medical 
treatment because the life of the infant is viewed as not worth living, 
there seems to be no good reason why the parent has a duty not to 
administer active euthanasia. Indeed the administration may be viewed 
as humane for the same reasons that withholding treatment is viewed 
as humane: active euthanasia permits the infant to avoid a life not 
worth living or filled with pain. In the example of the infant with the 
bowel obstruction, the failure to perform surgery will result in a period 
of painful waiting for an almost certain death.188 This pain could be 
avoided by the administration of euthanasia. Certainly if the quality of 
life of the infant with treatment will be so bad as to justify refusing 
treatment, the quality of life preceding death in this example must be 
viewed as even worse.189 
Active euthanasia would also avoid the merciful shortening of the 
lives of only those infants with poor life quality who fortuitously de-
velop other life-threatening diseases. If a Down's syndrome or trisomy 
13 child has such a poor quality of life that lifesaving treatment can 
legitimately be withheld, it seems unreasonable, and even unfair to the 
infant, to require that he develop a life-threatening disease to accom-
plish the goal of ending his life. 
The above should not, of course, be taken as a general endorse-
ment of active euthanasia. It is meant only to suggest that the blanket 
distinction between active and passive euthanasia cannot be fully sup-
ported when the purpose of withholding treatment is to cause the ces-
sation of a life viewed as not worth living or as socially or economically 
too costly. Such decisions are not merely treatment decisions. They are 
decisions to use the life-threatening condition as the means of termi-
nating the life and, when made by those with the duty of care this 
nontreatment is similar to direct euthanasia. 
D. Medical Treatment/Nonmedical Necessity Distinction 
Parents have the obligation to provide nonmedical necessities, 
such as food and water, for their children.190 If it is permissible for 
187. See note 1 and accompanying text supra. 
188. A review of the medical literature discloses cases where the parents of a child 
with Down's syndrome refused consent for surgery to remove a bowel obstruction. The 
child died of starvation after fifteen days of withholding treatment. Rowe, Infanticide: 
Who Makes the Decision?, 73 Wisc. MED. J. 10, 10 n.5 (1974). See note 41 supra. 
189. See generally cases cited at note 41 supra. 
190. The withholding of food and shelter from children has served as the basis of 
criminal liability for parents and guardians. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 188 Neb. 378, 
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parents to withhold medical treatment for the purpose of causing the 
death of the infant, the reasons for not permitting the withholding of 
nonmedical necessities to accomplish the same end should be 
explored.191 
Perhaps one reason to require that parents uniformly provide non-
medical necessities such as food and water, even if they may withhold 
lifesaving treatment, is that the obligation to provide sustenance has a 
longer tradition than medical care.192 Another reason may be that the 
withholding of nonmedical necessities will likely lead to a slow painful 
death while withholding medical treatment is likely to be less painful 
and more humane.193 These reasons do not provide a strong justifica-
tion for permitting the withholding of lifesaving medical treatment 
while not permitting the withholding of nonmedical necessities. Failing 
to give an infant water, which will surely result in his death, is not 
substantially di:ff erent from failing to give him an antibiotic for a life-
threatening infection. If it is acceptable to refuse to provide lifesaving 
medical treatment to an infant for the purpose of causing his death, it 
seems just as acceptable to deny nonmedical necessities under the 
same circumstances. 
E. Risk and Pain and Palliative Measures 
There may be some circumstances in which the withholding of 
nonexperimental treatment is reasonably justifiable.194 The circum-
196 N.W.2d 915 (1972); Zessman v. State, 573 P.2d 1174 (Nev. 1978); State v. Zobel, 81 
S.D. 260, 134 N.W.2d 101, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833 (1965). 
191. The withholding of nonmedical necessities such as food, water and shelter may 
be viewed as infanticide by exposure. Other types of euthanasia that might be considered 
infanticide are active euthanasia and withholding treatment from infants for the purpose 
of causing their early deaths. 
Infanticide has been widely reviewed. See, e.g., Burt, Authorizing Death for Anoma-
lous Newborns, GENETICS AND THE LAW 435 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1975); 
Damme, Infanticide: The Worth of an Infant Under Law, 22 MED. HIST. 1 (1978); Mon-
tag & Montag, Infanticide: A Historical Perspective, 62 MINN. MED. 368 (1979). 
192. Many forms of medical treatment, such as antibiotics, are of fairly recent origin. 
It may therefore be less traditional to require parents to provide these treatments. The 
parental duty to provide lifesaving medical care is well established. See note 1 and ac-
companying text supra. 
193. Food and water may have to be withheld from an infant until it dies because of 
decision to withhold treatment. If an infant, for example, has an esophagus which is not 
connected to his stomach, it cannot be fed or given water. The decision not to connect 
the esophagus to the stomach means that it cannot be given food or water by mouth. 
(The infant could be "fed" intravenously or through a tube to the stomach, at least for a 
short time). Reportedly Baby Doe, whose esophagus did not empty into his stomach, was 
not given nutrition or water, and died about six days following birth. See note 41, supra. 
194. As a general matter, there should be no obligation to accept experimental treat-
ment for an infant. This may be viewed as a matter of protecting infants from being 
human guinea pigs. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra. 
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stances in which treatment may be futile have previously been men-
tioned.195 There may be other instances in which the risks to the infant 
of treatment do not justify the treatment. The risks may include the 
further reduction of the length of life of the infant, or the very sub-
stantial reduction of the ability of the infant to enjoy or appreciate life. 
When the risk is that the treatment may significantly reduce the 
infant's life expectancy, the decision is based upon a comparison of the 
relative chance for survival as a result of treatment or nontreatment. 
This choice is fundamentally different from most of the situations dis-
cussed in previous sections.196 Here the choice is to promote the life of 
the infant, and treatment may be withheld to maximize the chances 
for the longest survival. The other decisions described generally in-
volved a decision whether or not to refuse treatment in order to mini-
mize the life expectancy of the infant. 
When the risk is that the treatment will dramatically reduce the 
ability of the infant to appreciate and enjoy life, then a true "quality of 
life" versus "quantity of life" issue is presented. The quality of life, for 
example, may be threatened by enormous pain. These decisions are 
fundamentally different from the decision to withhold treatment to 
cause death. These decisions, in effect, result in trading some length of 
life, or risk shortening life, with the hope of improving the life that 
remains. Such a tradeoff is common in medical treatment. Any correc-
tive surgery that is done on an infant, for example, carries with it some 
risk of death. These tradeoffs are reasonable in infant nontreatment 
situations as long as the improvement in life quality is substantial 
compared with the level of risk to life.197 There is some indication, 
195. See text accompanying note 167 supra. 
196. We have previously noted situations in which treatment was refused in order to 
end life without substantially improving the remaining life. See notes 124-65 and accom-
panying text supra. In some circumstances, the effect of refusing treatment would be 
both to decrease the length of life and worsen the quality of life. The refusal of surgery 
to correct an intestinal obstruction is one example. 
197. Within the ambit of this kind of decision making, parents may make reasonable 
medical treatment decisions for their children. Although any tradeoff between life expec-
tancy (risk) and the quality of life (benefits) must be reasonable, parents should be given 
considerable freedom of choice in determining what treatment their child will receive. 
Courts should proceed with caution when determining whether a medical treatment 
decision is reasonable. In the remarkable decision, In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 
156 Cal Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980), the court permitted parents to 
withhold lifesaving treatment. The treatment carried a 5 to 10 percent risk of death; 
without the treatment the child would suffer debilitating heart and lung diseases which 
will ultimately result in premature death. The court's decision was partly based on the 
risks of the procedure. In fact, Phillip's parents, in out-of-court statements, indicated 
that their reason for withholding treatment was that he had Down's syndrome. Note, 
The Outer Limits of Parental Autonomy: Withholding Medical Treatment from Chil-
dren, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 825 (1981). Courts should review the potential benefits of a 
medical procedure with a view toward the rights of the child. Claims of risk should not 
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however, that the range is limited within which parents can make deci-
sions about refusing traditional lifesaving treatment, even when that 
treatment is unpleasant.198 
Giving pain palliatives when there is some risk that they may 
cause the early death of an infant may be justified on the same 
grounds that the quality of life is improved even at the risk of shorten-
ing it somewhat. This is, of course, a much different concept from giv-
ing the pain palliative, even in the absence of significant pain, for the 
purpose of causing the death of the infant.199 
These treatment decisions raise some of the same issues discussed 
earlier about judgments concerning the quality of infant life.200 It is 
difficult to understand the quality of life of infants, particularly of de-
fective infants. Treatment decisions that risk shortening life for the 
sake of the quality of life, e.g., a life with less pain, require a compari-
son of a life with pain to a shorter life without some of the pain. The 
comparison does require some speculation about the relative comfort 
and pleasure of the two lives. Comparing two lives, particularly when 
the comparison involves pain and length of life, although difficult ap-
pears to call for judgments closer to the range of human experience 
than would be an effort to judge, in some absolute terms, whether a life 
is worth living at all. 
F. Proposed Standards for Decisions 
Several standards for withholding lifesaving treatment have been 
suggested by commentators. It has been proposed that treatment may 
be legitimately withheld if: the child cannot have higher brain activ-
ity;201 the cost and disruption to the family of the treatment and the 
life of the child are greater than the value of the life of the child;202 the 
child cannot hope to have a worthwhile life;203 the treatment is exces-
be permitted to go unreviewed. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820, N.Y.S. 
(1955); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). 
198. For example, in Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a judgment requiring that parents 
allow their child to undergo chemotherapy treatments for leukemia. 
199. Overdosing for the purpose of causing death would be active euthanasia. 
200. See notes 158-62 and accompanying text supra. 
201. The same result would occur if human life were defined as requiring higher 
brain activity. This would eliminate any requirement that a child without higher brain 
activity be treated since he would not be considered a human being. See McCORMICK, 
supra note 19; Kluge, supra note 16, at 246-49. See also note 15 supra. 
202. Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 5-7, 18, 27-28 (testimony of Dr. Ray-
mond Duff, Dr. Robert Cooke, Dr. Warren Reich, and Dr. Lewis Scheiner); Duff and 
Campbell, supra note 5, at 894; ENGELHARDT, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of 
Young Children, BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA 180 (1975); Lorber, supra note 102, at 300; 
Matson, supra note 102, at 226. 
203. Goldstein suggested that a decision to withhold treatment would be justified if 
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sively risky or is likely to cause substantial pain or suffering without 
correspondingly increasing the length of life;20' the proposed treatment 
is experimental;205 the treatment is futile in that it cannot have a sig-
nificant effect on the length of the infant's life;206 and the treatment is 
not customary under the circumstances.207 A variety of other standards 
for nontreatment have been proposed.208 These standards are not mu-
"there is less than a high probability that the . . . treatment will enable the child to 
pursue either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal growth toward adulthood." 
Goldstein, supra note 32, at 653. See also Conference Report, Critical Issues in Newborn 
Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal, 55 PEDIATRICS 756 (1975); 
Heyman & Holtz, The Severely Defective Newborn: The Dilemma and Decision Process, 
23 PuB. PoL'v 381, 395 (1975). 
204. See notes 195-200 & 203 and accompanying text supra. 
205. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra. 
206. See generally R. Veatch, Guardian Refusal of Lifesaving Medical Procedures 5-7 
(1976) (unpublished manuscript) quoted in Substituted Judgment, supra note 19, at 801 
(suggesting that treatment should not be required if it is useless or inflicts "grave bur-
dens"); A Standard for Nontreatment, supra note 1, at 623-25 (suggesting a "medical 
feasibility" standard); Judicial Limitations, supra note 32, at 1112-25. 
Ramsey referred to Lesch-Nyam disease as an example of another instance in which 
care may be futile. Ramsey, supra note 5, at 215. When children afflicted with this dis-
ease develop teeth they gnaw through their lips and bite off or mutilate any part of their 
body they can reach. Since "care [to prevent the effects of this condition] cannot be 
conveyed, it need not be extended." Id. 
207. See notes 127-30 and accompanying text supra. 
A variation of this standard requires that lifesaving treatment be provided if "a rea-
sonably prudent parent would consent" to it. Sokolosky, supra note 32, at 95. This stan-
dard would apparently involve an assessment using many of the same criteria employed 
by the cost/benefit standard. See note 202 and accompanying text supra. 
208, Other standards for non-treatment decisions which have been suggested include 
the following. Goldstein recommended that care may properly be withheld (i.e., the state 
would not intervene) if: (a) there is no proven medical procedure or (b) there is conflict-
ing medical opinion concerning the treatment procedure to follow or (c) there is less than 
a high probability that the treatment will enable the child to pursue relatively normal 
growth toward adulthood or a life worth living. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 653. This is, 
of course, an extraordinarily permissive standard which would permit treatment to be 
withheld from a wide range of sick children. For a critical response to this standard, see 
Sokolosky, supra note 32, at 76-84. 
Lorber suggested that care ought not be required for defective children for whom no 
known therapy could prevent multi-system handicaps, a short life expectancy and a low 
quality of life. Lorber, supra note 102, at 288. This appears to be essentially a "worth of 
life" standard. See note 203 and accompanying text supra. 
Coburn would permit active or passive euthanasia in cases where the infant will not 
survive the first several years of life, the life will be of no value or negative value and 
death will confer a "net benefit" to those most directly affected by it. Coburn would also 
permit active or passive euthanasia if the life will not be worth living, the infant would 
have to undergo significant suffering in order to reach the age of reason and the death of 
the infant would confer a "net benefit" to those most directly affected by it. Coburn, 
supra note 5, at 354. Although these standards are creative and carefully drawn, they 
appear to permit active and passive euthanasia in a fairly broad range of situations. 
Shatten and Chabon suggest that treatment should always be required if "the medi-
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treatment decisions are made which violate what the law apparently 
requires in terms of treatment.219 At the very least, these medical deci-
sions are being made without any serious effort to determine whether 
they conform to the requirements of the law. This in turn suggests that 
enforcement of legal standards in treatment decisions deserves the at-
tention of the legal system. 
A. Decision-Makers 
Nontreatment decisions are commonly made by physicians or phy-
sicians in consultation with the parents.220 Nontreatment decisions, 
however, are rarely reviewed by a hospital treatment or ethics commit-
tee.221 The Department of Health and Human Services has taken the 
position that hospitals have an obligation to help ensure that infants 
are not denied treatment because of physical or mental handicaps. 222 
The Department has informed hospitals that they risk the loss of fed-
eral funding for failing to treat infants because of physical or mental 
handicap. 223 The Department based its position on the Rehabilitation 
219. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra. 
220. Physicians often play a key role in non-treatment decisions by either making the 
decisions themselves, Waldman, Medical Ethics and the Hopelessly Ill Child, 88 J. PE-
DIATRICS 890 (1976); or by presenting information that discourages treatment, Duff & 
Campbell, supra note 1, at 892. See also Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 11-12 
(statement of Dr. Lewis Scheiner). 
221. See generally In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54-55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Accord Veatch, Hospital Ethics Committee: Is there a Role?, 7 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (June 1977); Note, No Code Orders vs. Resuscitation: The 
Decision to Withhold Life-Prolonging Treatment from the Terminally Ill, 26 WAYNE L. 
REV. 139, 168-69 (1979). 
222. On May 18, 1982, the Director of the Office for Civil Rights for the Department 
of Health and Human Services sent a "Notice to Health Care Providers" concerning 
"Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment." 
This letter followed shortly the report that lifesaving treatment and nourishment had 
been withheld from a Down's syndrome infant, Baby Doe, in Bloomington, Indiana. See 
note 41 supra. 
223. The following letter was sent by the Department of Health and Human Services 
on May 18, 1982 to health care providers regarding discrimination against handicapped 
persons. 
NOTICE TO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
SUBJECT: Discriminating Against the Handicapped 
by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment 
There has recently been heightened public concern about the adequacy of 
medical treatment of newborn infants with birth defects. Reports suggest that 
operable defects have sometimes not been treated, and instead infants have been 
allowed to die, because of the existence of a concurrent handicap, such as 
Down's syndrome. 
This notice is intended to remind affected parties of the applicability of sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794). Section 504 provides 
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Aet of 1973m which provides that the handicapped may not, solely 
'because of the handicap, be denied the benefits of or subject to dis-
crimination under any program receiving federal assistance. Handicap 
is broadly defined in the statute as a "physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more ... major life activities."22~ 
that "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason 
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Feder-
al financial assistance ••.. " Implementing regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services make clear that this statutory prohibition 
applies in the provision of health services (45 C.F.R. 84.52) and that conditions 
such as Down's syndrome are handicaps within the meaning of section 504 (45 
C.F.R. 84.3(j)). 
Under section 504 it is unlawful for a recipient of Federal financial assis-
tance to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical 
or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening condition, if: 
(1) the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and 
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance 
medically contraindicated. 
For example, a recipient may not lawfully decline to treat an operable life-
threatening condition in an infant, or refrain from feeding the infant, simply 
because the infant is believed to be mentally retarded. 
We recognize that recipients of Federal financial assistance may not have 
full control over the treatment of handicapped patients when, for instance, pa-
rental consent has been refused. Nevertheless, a recipient may not aid or perpet-
uate discrimination by significantly assisting the discriminatory actions of an-
other person or organization. 45 C.F.R. 84.4(b)(l)(v). Recipients must 
accordingly insure that they do not violate section 504 by facilitating discrimina-
tory conduct. 
In fulfilling its responsibilities, a Federally assisted health care provider 
should review its conduct in the following areas to insure that it is not engaging 
in or facilitating discriminatory practices: 
Counseling of parents should not discriminate by encouraging parents to 
make decisions which, if made by the health care provider, would be discrim-
inatory under section 504. 
Health care providers should not aid a decision by the infant's parents or 
guardian to withhold treatment or nourishment discriminatorily by allowing 
the infant to remain in the institution. 
Health care providers are responsible for the conduct of physicians with re-
spect to cases administered through their facilities. 
The failure of a recipient of Federal financial assistance to comply with the require-
ments of section 504 subjects that recipient to possible termination of Federal assistance. 
Moreover, section 504 does not limit the continued enforcement of State laws prohibiting 
the neglect of children, requiring medical treatment, or imposing similar responsibilities. 
224. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Regulations implementing the statute are at 45 C.F.R. § 
84 (1981). Programs receiving any form of federal financial assistance are covered, in-
cluding federal funds, services of federal personnel or property. Id. at § 84.2, § 84.3(h). 
Services provided in a facility which has been constructed or altered in part with federal 
money are also covered by the regulations. Id. at § 84.4(b)(6). 
225. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)(B)(1976). 
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tually exclusive. For example, treatment might be refused if it is both 
futile and experimental. 
The discussion of lifesaving decisions in this article implies several 
principles relevant to the appropriate legal standards for making such 
decisions.209 The ordinary/extraordinary (heroic) distinction is of little 
value in describing legal standards for treatment, but experimental 
treatment, as a form of extraordinary treatment, generally ought not to 
be required. 210 The presence of physical or mental defects in an infant 
(which are often referred to as quality of life issues),211 or the conse-
quences of the infant's existence on the family, society or others are 
not, in and of themselves, bases on which the law has made, or easily 
can make, life and death decisions. 212 The fact that an infant has a 
terminal disease does not by itself suggest that lifesaving treatment 
may automatically be withheld, although the terminal condition may 
make common treatment impossible or futile.213 Distinctions between 
active and passive euthanasia and medical and nonmedical necessities 
are of questionable validity when the purpose of withholding lifesaving 
treatment, or passive euthanasia, is to cause the death of the infant. 214 
Treatment may legitimately be withheld when it is too risky or when it 
cal profession agrees on a proper course of treatment, and if treatment will enable the 
child to make progress in growth and development, and if the failure to treat would 
result in the child's death." Shatten and Chaban, Decision-Making and the Right to 
Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for Defective Newborns, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 59, 74 (1982). 
Other standards that have been proposed are noted by Shatten and Chabon. Id. at 
73. 
209. See notes 119-200 and accompanying text supra. 
210. Requiring experimental treatment would provide a source of research subjects 
but would not necessarily be in the best interest of the child. Parents of a child suffering 
with a life threatening condition will often seek experimental treatments as a last hope, 
but such treatment should not be imposed against the parents' will. See notes 123-26 
supra. 
211. Predicating decisions to provide lifesaving treatment on the infant's "quality of 
life" is impractical since it cannot be determined with any degree of certainty and is 
inconsistent with the notion of equal protection of human life. See notes 152-65 supra. 
212. It is inappropriate to base a decision to permit or cause the death of an individ-
ual who is unable to act in his own behalf (e.g., an infant) upon hardships that are not 
life threatening. See notes 132, 168-69 & 202 and accompanying text supra. 
213. For example, a child afflicted with a terminal illness may have received treat-
ment which is incompatible with certain other medicines. As a result, the use of drugs 
which would conventionally be used to treat a life threatening condition would become 
either ineffective or dangerous. 
214. I have previously argued that it is misleading to attempt to justify passive eu-
thanasia (inaction) as simply allowing nature to "take its own course." We are generally 
unwilling to sanction a "let nature run its course" standard, particularly where infants 
are involved. See note 185 supra. When there is a duty to safeguard the interests of 
another person, there is very little difference between action (an act) and inaction (an 
omission) which is likely to ultimately cause the same result. See notes 181-87 and ac-
companying text supra. 
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will substantially lower the opportunity for appreciation and enjoy-
ment of life without a corresponding increase in the length of life. 2111 
A standard for nontreatment decisions can be suggested based on 
these principles. Lifesaving treatment may appropriately be withheld 
if: (1) the treatment would be futile in that there is no reasonable hope 
that it can more than insignificantly extend the life of the infant; (2) 
the proposed treatment is experimental; (3) the treatment is exces-
sively risky in that it will not maximize the infant's life expectancy; or 
(4) the probability that the treatment will cause substantial pain or 
suffering is not offset by a corresponding probability that it will in-
crease the length of life. 
The proposed standard appears to be consistent with the current 
law,216 although not fully consistent with some current medical prac-
tices.217 It rests on the premise that causing the death of an infant 
through inaction is not appropriate when the decision is based on the 
fact or assumption that the infant will be disruptive of, or in some way 
harmful to, the family or others, or that the infant's life is not worth 
living. 
V. DECISION-MAKERS AND ENFORCEMENT 
The legal standards governing nontreatment decisions which are 
adopted will be effective only if those making treatment decisions actu-
ally apply the proper standards.218 As noted earlier, a number of non-
215. See notes 195-200 and accompanying text supra. 
216. The legal principles concerning withholding treatment are examined in note 1 
supra. It may be argued that the law views the unprivileged shortening of a life as imper-
missible regardless of the extent to which the life span has been reduced. Consequently, 
speaking of "insignificantly" shortening a life is, at best, marginally within the limits of 
contemporary legal standards. See Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 
(1982) (court ordered that "invasive" and painful resuscitation techniques be withheld 
from a terminally ill infant when they could extend the life of the infant for only a short 
time). It may also be argued, albeit not very persuasively, that the present law does not 
permit the failure to provide treatment based upon a tradeoft' of quantity for quality of 
life. See notes 195-98 and accompanying text supra. When such a tradeoft' is legitimate, 
i.e., there is a risk of shortening life with a correspondingly real and substantial 
probability of an improved quality of life, the law does permit such decisions. In fact 
many kinds of medical treatment involve this tradeoft'. Much corrective surgery (for ex-
ample, cosmetic surgery for a deformed infant) has some risk of death associated with it. 
217. Modern medical practice probably results in withholding treatment in a some-
what broader range of cases, especially those involving seriously defective children who 
may have a negative impact on the family. See notes 2 & 40 supra. 
218. If legal standards are to be effectively administered, those who will apply them 
must be able to understand them, be able and willing to apply them in good faith, and 
have a means of ascertaining that each decision made conforms with the law. It appears 
that physicians and parents at the present time do not fully understand their responsi-
bilities under the law, are sometimes unwilling to strictly apply legal standards, and sel-
dom seek guidance from courts to ensure that their conduct conforms with the law. 
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"Physical or mental impairment" and "major life activities" have been 
defined by the Department by regulation. 228 
Among the actions which are prohibited by the regulations are 
providing the handicapped with benefits or services which are not as 
effective as those provided the nonhandicapped, or significantly aiding 
other agencies or persons that discriminate on the basis of handicap 
and that provide services to the "beneficiaries of the recipients pro-
gram. "227 Since hospitals are often constructed with some federal aid or 
operate federally funded progams, many hospital programs are under 
the obligation not to discriminate or aid others in discrimination based 
on handicap.228 Under current regulations, the services provided the 
handicapped must "afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to 
obtain the same result [or] to gain the same benefit" even if the ser-
vices do not produce the "identical result or level of achievement for 
handicapped and nonhandicapped."229 
In the context of handicapped infants, the Department has taken 
the position that it is unlawful for a recipient of federal financial assis-
tance to withhold medical or surgical treatment or nourishment from 
an infant because the child is handicapped unless the handicap renders 
the "treatment or nutritional sustenance medically contraindicated."230 
Although not entirely clear, "medically contraindicated" apparently 
means that treatment is inadvisable because the physical condition of 
the infant makes it too risky or futile. Presumably, the notion that the 
infant would not have a life worth living or would be too great a bur-
den on others because of the handicap would not be within the Depart-
ment's concept of "medically contraindicated." 
226. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 0)(2)(1981). 'Physical or mental impairment' means 
Id. 
(a) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomi-
cal loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; muscu-
loskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory; including speech organs; cardiovas-
cular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and 
endocrine; or 
(b) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic 
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 
(ii) 'Major life activities' means functions such as caring for one's self, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and 
working." 
227. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4 (b)(l)(iii), (iv)(1981). 
228. It may still be a matter of debate whether the federal law would apply to neona-
tal care if the hospital has received funds for other purposes but not for the specific care 
which the hospital is withholding. The discrimination may have been in connection with 
the part of the hospital (the specific program) which is receiving federal funding. See 
generally American Pub. Transit Assoc. v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (App. D.C. 1981); Miller 
v. Abilene Christian Univ. of Dallas, 517 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
229. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2)(1981). 
230. See note 223 supra. 
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To avoid aiding others in discriminating against handicapped in-
fants, hospitals were instructed not to counsel parents to withhold 
treatment and not to allow the infant to remain in the hospital if the 
parents refuse treatment. Hospitals were also told they are responsible 
for the conduct of physicians practicing in the hospital.231 This may 
impose a substantial burden on hospitals. Hospitals often have some 
obligation to oversee treatment provided by physicians.232 The respon-
sibility of hospitals for the conduct of physicians suggested by the De-
partment goes beyond that and might be difficult under the current 
treatment review structures of many hospitals. Furthermore, the obli-
gation of a hospital not to allow an infant to stay in its facilities if the 
parents wish to withhold treatment because of a handicap seems all 
but impossible to implement. The hospital might be expected to seek 
court ordered treatment if the parents refuse lifesaving treatment, but 
it is not at all clear how a hospital can remove a sick newborn from its 
facilities when the parents refuse treatment. For these reasons the De-
partment's position has been criticized by the health care industry.233 
Although it is unlikely that any hospital risks the immediate loss 
of federal funds,234 through federal or state regulation hospitals may be 
expected to exercise greater control over decisions to withhold lifesav-
ing treatment from infants. The use of the physician/attorney interdis-
ciplinary panel or team,2311 applying the standards for nontreatment 
suggested here,236 might permit hospitals to discharge this treatment 
review responsibility. 
The current decision process can be criticized on several 
grounds.237 To the extent that treatment is withheld without consulta-
tion with the parents it is contrary to basic concepts of informed con-
231. Id. 
232. See generally, Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 326, 
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
233. The American Hospital Association stated that it feared that the Department 
would "create an adversarial relationship between hospitals and parents ••.. "Quoted 
in Correspondence, 10 L., Med. & Health Care 142 (1982). 
234. The issue whether federal funds must be expended for the specific treatment 
which is being denied to the infant to make the federal regulations applicable is dis-
cussed in note 227, supra. In addition the process for removing federal funds is complex 
and probably can be implemented only after an effort has been made to remove the 
discrimination through less drastic means. See Fells v. Brooks, 522 F. Supp. 30, 33 
(D.D.C. 1981). 
235. See notes 244-48 and accompanying text infra. 
236. See notes 209-16 and accompanying text supra. 
237. The decision-making process has been criticized because some life and death 
decisions are apparently made without any reference to the requirements of the law. 
Rather, these decisions are often made by individuals who are in highly emotional states. 
Such decision-makers (i.e., the parents) may conflict with the best interests of the child. 
Moreover, very few of these important decisions are effectively reviewed by uninvolved 
third parties or groups to ensure such decisions meet with the requirements of the law. 
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sent, even though motivated by a desire to avoid having to trouble the 
parents with making a decision.238 Such unilateral decisions may sub-
ject the physician involved to liability.239 Some physicians may also 
view these as medical decisions in which the parents should play a 
small role and the law plays no role at all.240 It is, of course, true that 
medical judgments have an important role in the decisions, but the 
standards for determining when lifesaving treatment may legally be 
withheld must be established by the legal system. The establishment of 
standards for nontreatment as opposed to the application of the stan-
dards, is not a medical judgment, but rather a legal or value 
judgment.241 
The decision-making process may be inadequate even when non-
treatment decisions are made by the physician in consultation with the 
parents. The parents, as well as the physician, may have interests 
which are in conflict with the interests of the child, and these conflicts 
may prevent them from being able to apply the proper legal standard. 
238. The physician's motivation in withholding treatment without parental consulta-
tion, is not a relevant factor in determining the legal propriety of his actions. There is 
little legal basis for withholding treatment without fully consulting both parents, or at 
least one parent in extraordinary circumstances. 
239. Parents have the authority to consent to medical treatment for their children 
and a physician who renders treatment without obtaining such consent may be liable for 
negligence or battery. See authorities cited in notes 20-22, supra. The withdrawal of 
treatment is also presumed to be a treatment decision requiring informed consent. A 
physician holding back such treatment without obtaining the consent of the parties, or at 
least giving them notice of such action, may be liable for abandonment. See note 1 
supra. A hospital may also be held liable when treatment has been withheld without 
adequate consent. See Bonregois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957). See also 
notes 222-34 and accompanying text supra. Physicians may also have a duty, as well, to 
report suspected cases of child neglect or abuse even if the parents are involved in the 
decision. A physician failing to make such a report may be criminally or civilly liable. 
See Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 
118 (1974). 
240. The debate over whether the courts or medical review boards are the proper 
forum for adjudicating non-treatment decisions has resulted in charges of medical pater-
nalism (directed to those advocating that physicians should make the decisions) or legal 
imperialism (directed to those maintaining that the courts should be involved). See 
Baron, Assuring "Detached but Passionate Investigation and Decision": The Role of 
Guardians Ad Litem in Saikewicz-Type Cases, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 111 (1978); Baron, 
Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 
337 (1979); Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alter-
natives for Handling Saikewicz-Type Cases, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1979); Relman, The 
Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1978); Reiman, The 
Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEW }i:NG. J. MED. 508 (1978). 
241. See generally Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 2, at 58 (statement of Dr. 
Warren Reich); Gold, Wiser Than the Law?: The Legal Accountability of the Medical 
Profession, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 145 (1981); Veatch, Generalization of Expertise, 1 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 29 (April 1973); Substituted Judgment, supra note 19, at 807-08 
(1978). 
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The parents may want a normal child and be unwilling to care for one 
with defects; they may not wish or be able to support the child; or they 
may see the child as disruptive of their family or marriage.242 The phy-
sician, although dedicated and supportive, and parents, may find a de-
fective infant emotionally difficult to accept. They may experience a 
sense of guilt and anger which interferes with their ability to make 
treatment decisions in the child's best interest.243 It is hard to imagine 
circumstances in which parents are less likely to be emotionally well 
suited to make life and death decisions in the best interest of a child 
than they are shortly after realizing that the child may be seriously 
defective. 
If the current decision system is not working, a review mechanism 
may be needed.244 A judicial review to determine whether nontreat-
ment decisions adhere to legal standards might be desirable,2411 but 
such a system would undoubtedly be so cumbersome and slow to pro-
vide review that it would be ineffective in many cases.246 An ethics 
committee review might be able to respond more quickly, although the 
diversity of backgrounds which would make such a committee valuable 
242. See Cohen, The Impact of the Handicapped Child on the Family, 43 Soc. 
CASEWORK 137 (1962); Note, The Outer Limits of Parental Autonomy: Withholding 
Medical Treatment from Children, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 813, 829 (1981). But see Duff & 
Campbell, supra note 2. 
243. Often parents must make the non-treatment decision at a time when they are 
emotionally upset over their child's condition. It has been suggested that parents who, at 
the time of birth, dreaded the thought of raising a defective child, may have an entirely 
different perspective and opinion several months later. See Medical Ethics Hearings, 
supra note 2, at 13 (statement of Dr. Robert Cooke); Ellis, supra note 1 at 414-15. See 
generally Fletcher, supra note 5. 
244. See generally Kindregan, supra note 24. In a situation such as in Maine Medical 
Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct., Cumberland Co., Me. Feb. 13, 1974), reported 
in Brant, supra note 15, the decision made could be routinely handled under the current 
process. See note 133 supra, for a discussion of the Maine case. It has been suggested 
that an alternative approach would be for the parties to try to reach a consensus on what 
treatment, if any, should be performed. See generally, Heyman & Holtz, The Severely 
Defective Newborn: The Dilemma and the Decision Process, 23 Pue. PoL'Y 381 (1975). 
245. Some jurisdictions differ on the advisability of judicial review of decisions to 
withhold lifesaving treatment. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 427 (1977) (judicial review required for non-treat-
ment decision of non-infant); A Standard for Nontreatment, supra note 1, at 630-32 
(need for judicial review and expedited hearing in emergency). But see In re Quinlan, 70 
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (rejecting judicial review of deci-
sion withholding treatment to female adult); Horwitz, Of Love and Laetrile: Medical 
Decision Making in a Child's Best Interests, 5 AM. J.L. & MEn. 271, 286-91 (1979). 
246. Even if a judicial review of the decision is not required, a physician is free, of 
course, to seek a court determination of the physician's and parents' obligations prior to 
withholding treatment to provide protection against subsequent legal action. Given the 
conflicting decisions on withholding treatment, physicians would be well advised to seek 
judicial clarification of their responsibilities before suspending treatment. 
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might also make it extremely difficult to convene quickly.247 Such a 
group would not have great experience in applying legal standards. 
Similar groups, however, apply relatively complex legal standards to 
experimentation on human subjects.248 
Adequate review before a nontreatment decision is implemented is 
difficult. In addition to an ethics advisory board, provision could be 
made for a swift post hoc judicial review of decisions when there can-
not be a review before the decision is made. The inability of such a 
review to prevent errors in withholding treatment before the death of 
an infant would be a clear disadvantage of such a system. 
Another alternative is to require that an independent physician 
certify that the criteria for nontreatment contained in the standards 
have been met before treatment can be withdrawn. 249 This type of re-
view has the advantage of being accomplished quickly and easily before 
action is taken, and the disadvantages of risking intra-professional 
"backscratching" and requiring physicians to apply legal standards.250 
One variation on the physician review theme would be to have a 
team consisting of a physician and an attorney conduct the review. The 
attorney would provide expertise in applying the legal standards and 
the physician an independent medical view. Treatment could not be 
withdrawn or withheld unless both members of the team certified that 
nontreatment was appropriate, the attorney determining that legal 
standards were met and the independent physician determining that 
247. New Jersey had provided for a review of decisions withdrawing lifesaving treat-
ment. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 49-51, 355 A.2d at 668-69. See Medical Ethics Hearings, 
supra note 2, at 17-18 (statement of Dr. Robert Cooke supporting ethics committee re-
view of withholding treatment decisions). 
248. Human studies committees (Institutional Review Boards) are required for ex-
periments involving human subjects which are funded by federal agencies or which in-
volve drugs currently being studied. 21 C.F.R. § 56 (1981). The committees should be 
comprised of individuals involved in such diverse disciplines as medicine, law, and phi-
losophy and ethics, as well as laymen from the community. The responsibilities of the 
committees are to review protocols to ensure that the rights of human subjects (including 
the right of adequate informed consent) are protected and that the benefits of the exper-
imentation exceed the costs. Id. The quality of these committee reviews varies considera-
bly. See Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 484 
(1979). The inconsistency of the decisions, as well as the time it would take for a board 
to deliberate, emphasizes the problems that would result if these committees were relied 
upon too heavily to review treatment decisions. An ethics committee can have review 
authority to make or veto decisions or simply have an advisory role. See Note, No Code 
Orders vs. Resuscitation: The Decision to Withhold Life-Prolonging Treatment from 
the Terminally Ill, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 139, 168-71 (1979). 
249. See notes 222-36 and accompanying text supra. 
250. Such a process would permit a second medical opinion as to the success of a 
treatment but might not significantly provide a way of ensuring that withholding treat-
ment would conform to legal standards. See generally Parham v. J.R., 422 U.S. 584 
(1979). 
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the medical condition of the infant had been assessed correctly. If ap-
pointed by a court, with the responsibility of reporting back to the 
court, this process would provide for a timely review and, at the same 
time, significant assurance to the treating physician that he was not 
violating the law in withholding treatment. In appropriate cases the 
attorney could be made responsible for bringing unresolved legal issues 
to the attention of the courts. Such an approach would, of course, re-
quire physicians treating infants to give notice before withholding life-
saving treatment. 
This last option, the attorney and independent physician review, 
appears to have real promise. It avoids cumbersome court and commit-
tee procedures and allows an informed interdisciplinary review of criti-
cal nontreatment decisions. Such a review process, using narrowly de-
fined nontreatment standards, might be established by hospitals in an 
effort to meet the obligations that they have, to avoid discrimination 
against handicapped infants.2111 
B. Enforcement 
Enforcement of legal standards regarding nontreatment has been 
difficult for two reasons: (1) the decisions to withhold treatment have 
generally been hidden from the view of the public2112 and the legal sys-
tem, and (2) prosecution of the few nontreatment and nonmalicious 
active euthanasia cases has been unsuccessful.2113 Juries have been un-
derstandably reluctant to return homicide convictions where parents or 
physicians have in desperation caused the death of an unfortunate 
child. It is, of course, also possible that this demonstrates an accept-
ance of euthanasia by jurors and the public which is not reflected in 
251. The suggestion here and at notes 240-41 supra, is not that physicians are unfit 
or unable to adopt legal standards but simply that they are not trained to know and 
interpret legal standards. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 264 n.271 (physicians receive 
no training and lack the background which "qualifies them to identify, assess, and bal-
ance all interests involved-in short, to 'play judge' "). 
252. There is no public review committee which is likely to know of or review these 
decisions. Nor have internal hospital review committees been very active in bringing 
cases of withholding infant treatment to the attention of the public or government 
agencies. 
253. See United States v. Repouille, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) (applicant for U.S. 
citizenship killed defective son with chloroform and was convicted of second degree man· 
slaughter with recommendation of "utmost clemency" and accepted for citizenship); 
Robertson, supra note 1, at 217 n.27 (reporting Arizona case where sustenance withheld 
from child by parents and physician; following death, coroner's jury found that child had 
died of meningitis, and physician and parents not prosecuted); A Standard for Non-
treatment, supra note 1, at 615 n.84 (listing cases). See also Sanders, None Dare Call It 
Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 351, 355 (1969). But see Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 
231 N.E.2d 147 (1967). 
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the legal system. 254 Whatever the reason, successful enforcement of le-
gal standards regarding nontreatment does not appear to lie with 
homicide prosecutions. Even in this day of deregulation, some addi-
tional review and reporting of nontreatment decisions seems more 
likely to promote adherence to the legal standards. 21111 The review by 
the physician/attorney team previously described would be one method 
of review.2116 
The decisions to withhold lifesaving treatment from an infant 
should be recorded along with the reasons and basis for the deci-
sions. 2117 Under this system, the records would be subject to court re-
view and failure to follow adequate standards or process would leave 
the physician or parents open to legal sanctions, although not necessa-
rily charges of criminal homicide. Unless criminal action is undertaken, 
the reports would be confidential and not available to the public, thus 
protecting the privacy of the infant and parents.2118 
Reports to the state concerning prescription drugs and abortions 
must be made in some states.2119 Withholding lifesaving treatment is a 
matter of even greater concern than either of these areas because it 
involves the death of a human being. Requiring a report of such non-
treatment seems quite reasonable in light of the gravity of the decision 
254. It might be that there is a willingness to withhold treatment to cause the death 
of infants whose lives seem worthless or whose presence is frightening or disconcerting 
but yet an unwillingness to admit this because it is inconsistent with our moral and legal 
principles. 
255. All states now have child abuse reporting statutes requiring medical personnel 
to report suspected child abuse cases to state authorities. Given the importance of deci-
sions to withhold lifesaving treatment and the potential for these decisions to become 
"neglect" reporting seems appropriate. See V. DEFRANCIS & C. LICHT, CHILD ABusE LEG-
ISLATION IN THE 1970's (6th rev. ed. 1974); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The 
Shape of Legislation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1967); Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, 
Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 
(1972); Protecting Children from Parents, supra note 32. 
256. See text following note 250 supra. 
257. Dr. Robert Sheiner suggests that decisions to withhold treatment should be 
made public. "We act our best, our noblest, when someone else is looking .... Difficult 
decisions should be published, and commented on by doctors and laymen." Medical Eth-
ics Hearings, supra note 2, at 21-22 (statement of Dr. Robert Sheiner). 
258. As with other medical information, data concerning the withholding of treat-
ment is likely to be considered highly private by many people. While there is a public 
need to know about these decisions, this interest probably would be best served if the 
courts and appropriate government agencies had access to the data on a confidential 
basis. 
259. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (physician required to report informa-
tion concerning prescriptions for "dangerous" drugs); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52 (1976) (physicians required to report information about abortions). In each 
instance, the state provided for the confidentiality of the data. 429 U.S. at 601; 428 U.S. 
at 81. 
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and the difficulty of adequately enforcing legal standards without such 
reports. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Although parents are generally empowered to make medical deci-
sions concerning their infant children, this right is not absolute and 
may be limited to protect a strong state interest.200 There is a state 
interest in reviewing decisions to withhold treatment, particularly 
when the decision would put the infant's life in jeopardy.201 
The two potential privacy interests in infant nontreatment deci-
sions are the interests of the parents in child rearing and the interest 
of the child in autonomy.262 As noted, child rearing interests do not 
extend to unnecessarily putting the life of the child at substantial 
risk.263 There are serious conceptual problems in suggesting that par-
ents can exercise a right of privacy on behalf of an infant. Autonomy 
privacy is, at its core, the right to make for oneself decisions about 
intensely personal matters. Therefore, the parents can no more exer-
cise autonomy privacy for a child than they can exercise the religious 
freedom of the infant. 
Decisions to withhold lifesaving treatment are a great deal more 
complex than has been commonly recognized. The Decision Matrix 
presented264 demonstrates the complexity of such decisions. 
A distinction has been drawn by many between ordinary and ex-
traordinary treatment. This distinction is confusing and potentially 
dangerous. There is no common and clear understanding of what the 
basic concept of extraordinary treatment is. It might mean experimen-
tal, generally accepted, customary under the circumstances, a very high 
cost/benefit ratio, very invasive or treatment that most people would 
reject.265 Some of these concepts are amorphous and virtually impossi-
ble to apply consistently, or are open to interpretation which would 
permit treatment to be withheld, at least arguably, inappropriately.~68 
As demonstrated, the use of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is 
not useful and extraordinary should be supplanted in favor of terms or 
phrases which more clearly identify the concept intended. 
Other distinctions which are at times made in nontreatment deci-
sions are between normal and abnormal infants,267 active and passive 
260. See notes 20-38 and accompanying text supra. 
261. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra. 
262. See notes 49-95 and accompanying text supra. 
263. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra. 
264. See notes 97-118 and accompanying text supra. 
265. See notes 119-49 and acompanying text supra. 
266. See note 121 and accompanying text supra. 
267. See notes 150-58 and accompanying text supra. 
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euthanasia,268 and medical and nonmedical necessities.269 These dis-
tinctions do not appear to be very useful in defining circumstances in 
which lifesaving treatment may be appropriately withheld. Lifesaving 
treatment might be withheld from a mentally retarded or physically 
defective infant because the life of the child is not worth living, the 
infant's existence or treatment places too great a burden on the family 
and society, or the risks of the procedure are too great.210 The first two 
reasons are not so much treatment decisions as they are decisions 
whether to take advantage of the presence of a life-threatening condi-
tion to cause the death of the infant. Nontreatment decisions, in such 
situations, should not be legally permissible. 271 
Based on the analysis in this article, standards for withholding 
livesaving treatment are suggested. Treatment may properly be with-
held if: (1) the treatment would be futile because there is no reasonable 
hope that it would extend the life of the infant significantly; (2) the 
proposed treatment is experimental; (3) the treatment is excessively 
risky in that it will not maximize the infant's life expectancy; or (4) the 
probability that the treatment will cause substantial pain or suffering 
is not offset by a corresponding probability that it will increase the 
length of life. 272 
The legal standards governing nontreatment will be effective only 
if they are recognized and applied by those making treatment deci-
sions. Current practice seems to have produced a system where there is 
frequent unrecognized deviation from what the legal standards appear 
to be. A reasonable review mechanism could be used to ensure that 
legal standards are followed in a timely fashion. An attorney, indepen-
dent physician team which is responsible for reviewing and approving 
decisions to withhold lifesaving treatment from infants, would bring 
unresolved legal issues to the attention of the courts. Hospitals might 
adopt such a process to meet any obligations they might have to avoid 
discrimination against handicapped infants. Decisions to withhold life-
saving treatment from infants should be recorded, along with the rea-
sons for the decisions. Unless legal action is undertaken, the reports 
should be confidential and not available to the public. Such an ap-
proach would help assure that lifesaving treatment is withheld from 
infants only when it is legally justified.273 
268. See notes 162-87 and accompanying text supra. 
269. See notes 188-91 and accompanying text supra. 
270. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra. 
271. See notes 162-87 and accompanying text supra. 
272. See notes 200-16 and accompanying text supra. 
273. As this symposium was in the final stages of publication, the President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research released its final report and the Department of Health and Human Services 
issued "interim final" rules regarding withholding lifesaving treatment from defective 
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infants. 
In a companion paper to the final report, the President's Commission proposed 
fairly narrow standards for withholding treatment from infants. They suggested a "net 
benefit" best interest of the child standard and also recommended that these decisions 
be left to parents and their physicians. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETH!• 
CAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO 
FOREQO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT. A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL 
ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 127-28, 218-19 (1983). Given the potential conflict be-
tween these decision-makers and the infant, it appears that the decision process would 
make it very difficult to ensure that the proposed standard is used in practice. 
The federal regulations, which became effective March 22, 1983, provide for the 
posting of infant care notices in maternity and pediatric hospital facilities. The notice 
requests anyone kno\ving of the denial of "customary medical care" or food to handi-
capped infants contact the Department. A toll-free number is provided. 48 Fed. Req. 
9630-32 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 84.61). This regulation should increase the 
incentive for hospitals to provide internal procedures to ensure that infant care decisions 
are consistent with legal standards. 
